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RECENT CASE NOTES
Bills and Notes-Acceleration of Maturity-Validity
of "Unsafe and Insecure" Clauses
Defendant Bank held four notes that were executed by Plaintiff.
Each of the notes provided that the holder could accelerate the
maturity at any time it believed that the debtor was unsafe or in-
secure. Prior to the maturity of the notes, Plaintiff's drug store was
damaged by water, and Plaintiff was arrested for illegal use of
narcotics. Upon default in the installments due on two of the notes,
Defendant notified Plaintiff that the balance due on all of the notes
had been matured and that Plaintiff's savings and checking accounts
had been offset against the balance due. Plaintiff sued for damages
for the alleged wrongful offset. Held: Provisions that allow the
holder of a promissory note to accelerate the maturity of the note
when it believes the debtor is unsafe and insecure are valid and
enforceable contractual provisions. Baldwin v. Peoples Nat'l Bank,
327 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
An instrument that is payable on a contingency is not negotiable,
and the happening of the event does not cure this defect.1 Moreover,
by the weight of authority a provision that is conditioned on the
holder's belief that he is unsafe or insecure introduces an element
of uncertainty as to the time of payment and the amount to be paid
and renders the note non-negotiable.' However, between the original
parties to the instrument negotiability is neither essential to the
validity of the note nor material to the right of recovery.'
Most American jurisdictions recognize the validity of acceleration
clauses conditioned on the maker's default4 or on the performance
of certain agreements.' Clauses conditioned on the maker's default
' Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 4; see Tex, Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5932
(1949).
'Murrell v. Exchange Bank, 168 Ark. 645, 271 S.W. 21 (1925); Moyer v. Hyde, 35
Idaho 161, 204 Pac. 1068 (1922); see generally Annot., 72 A.L.R. 268 (1931); Annot.,
44 A.L.R. 1397 (1926); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 872 (1925); Annot., 28 A.L.R. 699 (1924);
Note, 7 W. Res. L. Rev. 482 (1956); contra, Dart Nat'l Bank v. Burton, 258 Mich. 283,
241 N.W. 858 (1932).
3Robinson v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 89 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 716 (1937); Gross v. Von Dolcke, 313 Mich. 132, 20 N.W.2d 838 (1945).4 Puckett v. Big Lake State Bank, 73 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.;
see Star Brewing Co. v. Higgins, 248 Mass. 480, 143 N.E. 332 (1924); Andres v. Brown,
- Mo. _, 300 S.W.2d 800 (1957) (stating Texas law); Roberts v. Snow, 27 Neb.
425, 43 N.W. 241 (1889).
'Continental Nat'l Bank v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948); see Com-
merce Trust Co. v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co., 113 Kan. 311, 214 Pac. 610 (1923);
Nickell v. Bradshaw, 94 Ore. 580, 183 Pac. 12 (1919).
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are not unconscionable or against public policy;' they are simply
agreements providing for the time when the debt shall become due
and enforceable. Moreover, such agreements are specifically enforce-
able in a court of equity.7 Texas is in accord with the majority of
jurisdictions in recognizing the validity of acceleration clauses; how-
ever, courts of this state will not enforce harsh and oppressive use
of the provisions.8 Moreover, Texas courts have granted relief from
certain acceleration provisions on the ground that enforcement of
the clauses would lead to inequitable consequences.! Thus, although
the validity of an "unsafe and insecure" provision had not been
litigated in this state prior to the instant case, most Texas courts
were traditionally more favorable to debtors."
Without discussing Texas law on the validity of acceleration
clauses, the court in the principal case accepted the reasoning of a
New York case, Updilke v. Manufacturers' Trust Co.,11 as authority
for the validity of an "unsafe and insecure" provision." However,
the court pointed out that the unsafe and insecure feeling must be
the result of a good faith determination based on sufficient undis-
puted facts.1" Thus, an implied limitation was included in the pro-
vision which, together with Texas' equitable policy toward debtors,
may give some protection to the maker. However, the limitation
necessarily requires that each case be determined on its facts; hence,
the holder is deprived of any assurance that his "unsafe and insecure
feeling" is justified. Moreover, the applicability of the Updike4 case
is questionable, because the note in that case provided for the specific
contingency which occurred and the court merely upheld an arm's
length agreement. It would seem that the court in the principal case
could have supported its decision more adequately by extending to
unsafe and insecure" clauses the Texas doctrine upholding accelera-
6 French v. Winstead, 299 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957).
7Harris v. Kessler, 124 Cal. App. 299, 12 P.2d 467 (1932); Hawkinson v. Banaghan,
203 Mass. 591, 89 N.E. 1054 (1909).
'Bischoff v. Rearick, 232 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.
'Bischoff v. Rearick, supra note 8; Brown v. Hewett, 143 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940) error ref.; Crumley v. Ramsey, 93 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error
ref.; Parker v. Mazur, 13 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.
' Bischoff v. Rearick, 232 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.c.; Parker
v. Mazur, supra note 9.
11 243 App. Div. 15, 275 N.Y.S. 716 (1934), aff'd, 267 N.Y. 528, 196 N.E. 563, cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 648 (1935).
12 Ibid.
1a 327 S.W.2d 616, at 620.
" Updike v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 243 App. Div. 15, 275 N.Y.S. 716 (1934),
aff'd, 267 N.Y. 528, 196 N.E. 563, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 648 (1935).
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tion provisions,1 or by drawing an analogy to the validity of con-
tracts conditioned on the personal satisfaction of one party.6
The result of the principal case seems to conflict with the tradi-
tional policy of Texas courts, viz, favoring debtors over creditors.
Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine more extreme circumstances
than those present in the instant case, and Defendant may have
been justified in his unsafe and insecure feeling. However, it is
doubtful that the good faith determination required by the court is
sufficient to protect a more stable debtor in less extreme circum-
stances against the arbitrary acceleration of his note. It is the belief
of this writer that the court did not intend to give holders the un-
qualified right to accelerate the maturity of notes with only their
good faith as a deterrent. Future decisions should establish a more
sufficient standard to guide the holders of notes which contain "un-
safe and insecure" acceleration provisions.
Ann E. Harrell
Community Property-Joint Tenancy-Survivorship
Husband and Wife purchased shares of corporate stock with com-
munity funds. The spouses had the stock issued to them as joint
tenants with a right of survivorship. Upon the death of Husband,
his son by a previous marriage challenged the validity of the sur-
vivorship provision on the ground that the stock retained its com-
munity status as a matter of law. Held: Despite recitals of joint ten-
ancy in the certificates, stock which is purchased with community
funds retains its community status upon the death of one of the
spouses. Hilley v. Hilley, 327 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
At common law, two or more persons holding property jointly
are presumed to hold the property as joint tenants with a right of
survivorship.! The Texas Legislature abolished the right of survivor-
ship with respect to property held in common-law joint tenancy.'
" Andres v. Brown, - Mo. -, 300 S.W.2d 800 (1957) (stating Texas law);
Continental Nat'l Bank v. Conner, 147 Tex. 218, 214 S.W.2d 928 (1948); Puckett v.
Big Lake State Bank, 73 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref.
" Griffith v. Thompson, 244 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
' Moynihan, Real Property 130 (1940).
a Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2580 (1951). This statute was enacted in 1848 and
remained unchanged until the enactment of the present Probate Code in 1955 at which time
it was further provided "that by an agreement in writing of joint owners of property,
the interest of any joint owner who dies may be made to survive to the surviving joint
owner or joint owners, but no such agreement shall be inferred from the mere fact that
the property is held in joint ownership."
[Vol. 14
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However, the courts did not consider this abolition of the incident
of survivorship by statute as absolute. In 1939, Chandler v. Kountz'
held that persons receiving property jointly may contract "that the
property in question should pass to and vest in the survivors as at
common law"" by right of survivorship.' However, the Chandler
case did not involve an agreement between a husband and wife con-
cerning community property; rather, the case dealt with the crea-
tion of joint tenancies generally. Section 46 of the Texas Probate
Code codified the holding in the Chandler case by specifically pro-
viding for institution of the right of survivorship by agreement
between persons holding property jointly." The only clear and direct
applications of this section to community property have involved
United States Government Bonds.!
The Texas community property law provides for numerous meth-
ods of transforming community property into the separate property
of a spouse, e.g., by statutory partition, division on divorce or per-
manent separation, testamentary disposition, and gift.8 However,
courts closely scrutinize all transactions which involve an attempted
change of community property into separate property and "if there
is doubt as to the validity of the transaction it will be resolved in
favor of the Community."' The controversial"0 holding in Ricks v.
3 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref.4 Id. at 329.
Moynihan, op. cit. supra note 1, at 131.
8 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 46 (1955); Chandler v. Kountz, 130 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939) error ref.
'Ricks v. Smith, -Tex- 318 S.W.2d 439 (1958); see Steffens v. Pollard, 319
S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), aff'd, -Tex.-, -- S.W.2d_. (3 Tex. Sup. Ct.
Journ. 54, 1959). In Reed v. Reed, 283 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), the Dallas
Court of Civil Appeals held that postal savings certificates in the name of the husband
and wife as joint tenants did not pass to the surviving wife. Three years later in Ricks
v. Smith, supra, the supreme court held that United States bonds in the name of the hus-
band and wife passed to the surviving wife. In Steffens v. Pollard, supra, the same court
of civil appeals held, in affirming the consent decree of the Probate Court, that building and
loan shares and federal credit union deposits held by the husband and wife as joint
tenants and United States bonds payable to the husband or wife passed to the surviving
wife. On the merits, however, the court relied heavily on Ricks v. Smith, supra. The
supreme court granted a writ of error to resolve the conflict between the Reed and Stef-
fens cases but managed to avoid the instant question. The court of civil appeals was
affirmed because the supreme court held that the consent decree had foreclosed the ques-
tion.
'Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 15; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4624a, 4638 (1955);
Bearden v. Knight, 149 Tex. 108, 228 S.W.2d 837 (1950); Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex.
61, 36 S.W.2d 152 (1931); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925);
Corrigan v. Goss, 160 S.W. 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) error ref. See also Speer, Marital
Rights in Texas 156 (3d ed. 1929); Recent Case Note, 4 Sw. L.J. 218 (1950).
'King v. Bruce, 197 S.W.2d 830, 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), rev'd on other grounds,
145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947); Rowlett v. Mitchell, 114 S.W. 845 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1908).
"
0 See Recent Case Note, 13 Sw. L.J. 369, 371 (1959).
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Smith" indicates another means of transforming community prop-
erty into separate property. That case held that United States Gov-
vernment Bonds purchased with community funds passed to the
wife as her separate property upon the death of the husband. The
court in the Ricks case reasoned that the terms of the Treasury Reg-
ulations governing these bonds constituted an agreement which satis-
fied section 46 of the Texas Probate Code.
2
The court refused to apply the method of transformation sug-
gested in Ricks v. Smith to the facts in the instant case." Viewing
the rule of the Ricks case as applicable only in fact situations involv-
ing United States Government Bonds, the court relied instead on
earlier cases in reaching its decision."4 Moreover, the court pointed
out that the Ricks decision was predicated on a view which "recog-
nizes the supremacy of the Federal Statutes and Treasury regula-
tions""2 and "no more affects community property law than laws
of descent and distribution."' " The court also noted that the dis-
senting opinion in the Ricks case urged that the decision would have
no application in instances where the wife dies first; in this situation
a transformation of community property into the separate property
of the husband would be avoided." Thus, the court's opinion con-
fines spouses to the conventional devices of community property
law'" for changing community property into separate property. Be-
cause of the specific finding that the essential elements of a gift from
the husband to the wife were lacking," the court concluded that
the property passed to the wife impressed with a community char-
acter.
The principal case raises serious doubt as to whether a husband
and wife can hold property purchased with community funds as
joint tenants with an enforceable right of survivorship. Although
Ricks v. Smith impliedly validated a transformation of community
"-Tex.-__, 318 S.W.2d 439 (1958).
12 Id. at 440.
"a 327 S.W.2d 467.
"*Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 975 (1943); Harmon v. Schmitz, 39
S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); Reed v. Reed, 283 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. Civ. App.
1955); King v. Bruce, 197 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946), rev'd on other grounds,
145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947).
15327 S.W.2d 467, 468, quoting from the court of civil appeals' opinion in Smith
v. Ricks, 308 S.W.2d 941, 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), aff'd, _-_Tex.-., 318 S.W.2d
439 (1958).
'eRicks v. Smith, .-- Tex.-., 318 S.W.2d 439, 442 (1958).
'" Ibid. This additional precaution is in keeping with the general policy of restricting
the husband as the community manager, i.e., the spouse with more opportunity to effect
an improper transformation of community property.
" See authorities cited note 8 supra. See also Coghlan, Changing One Type of Marital
Property into Another Type, 4 Sw. L.J. 218 (1950).
'9 327 S.W.2d at 468.
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property into separate property by agreement between the spouses,
the court in the instant case would restrict Ricks v. Smith to the
unique contractual obligations created by the purchase of govern-
ment bonds. A change of community property into separate prop-
erty upon the death of a spouse through the specific terms of an
agreement between the spouses would seem to have been the next
step following the Ricks decision, and the court in the instant case
refused to take that step. Thus, it would seem that the Ricks decision
allowing the right of survivorship between spouses to effect a change
in community property may be relied upon only in instances in-
volving United States Government Bonds. With respect to other
community property, the doubt which is created by the principal
case may be resolved only by a decision of the Texas Supreme Court.
Reagan M. Martin
Constitutional Law - Searches and Seizures
Standing To Suppress Unreasonably
Seized Evidence
Defendant was convicted for illegal possession of narcotics1 on the
basis of evidence obtained in an apartment where he was found by
officers of the United States Government pursuant to a subsequently
contested warrant to search for narcotics.' Defendant moved to
suppress the evidence on the ground that the search was unreason-
able.' The Government contended that Defendant lacked standing
to suppress the evidence because he neither alleged ownership of the
seized articles nor claimed an interest in the apartment greater than
that of "invitee or guest."' Held: A defendant has standing to chal-
lenge the validity of a search warrant and to suppress unreasonably
seized evidence when (1) possession of the seized item is the basis
' Conviction was under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4704(a), "[A]bsence of .. .stamps
from narcotic drugs shall be prima facie evidence of a violation . . . by the person in
whose possession the same may be found," and 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 21 U.S.C.A. 5 174
(1958), "[P]ossession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction.
' The search warrant alleged occupancy by the Defendant. Record, p. I.
aDefendant contended that the search was unreasonable on two grounds: (1) the
warrant was issued without probable cause, and (2) the search violated 62 Stat. 820
(1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3109 (1958) (officer may break in after notice and refusal of
admittance). Brief for Petitioner, pp. 45, 55.
' The Government, however, charged Defendant with possession in the Complaint and
offered evidence at the trial to the same effect. Record, pp. 5, 38. At the pre-trial hearing
of the motion to suppress, the Government contended that, if Defendant alleged possession
of the narcotic, they were entitled to use such allegation against him at his trial. Record,
p. 22.
19601
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of conviction, or (2) he is legitimately on the premises searched.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).'
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and the issuance of search
warrants without probable cause.' In Boyd v. United States' the
Supreme Court indicated a tendency to limit the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the amendment. Adams v. New
York' signified a deviation from the trend; however, Weeks v.
United States' proved that the departure was only temporary. The
Court in the Weeks case gave full effect to the constitutional pro-
tection by requiring the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence;
10
the holding later took codified form in rule 41 (e) 1 of the Federal
5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter disposed of Defendant's first objection (see note 3 supra)
holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. 362 U.S. at 267-72.
Mr. Justice Douglas disagreed. Id. at 273. Since the S 3109 challenge was first made in
the circuit court, the Court held that the record was not sufficient enough to enable it
to decide the point and remanded the cause for consideration of Defendant's contention.
Id. at 272-73.
0 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
116 U.S. 616 (1886). Although the Court held that a statute requiring surrender
of private papers violated the fourth amendment because it invaded the individual's "in-
defeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property," various au-
thorities have suggested that the statute could as easily have been held only to violate
the fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination. Frankel, Concerning Searches
and Seizures, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 366 (1921); Comment, Judicial Control of Illegal
Search and Seizure, 58 Yale L.J. 144, 150 (1948).
s 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Police officers with a search warrant for policy slips searched
the defendant's office and took policy slips and also private papers for which there was
no warrant. Defendant objected to the receipt in evidence of the private papers which,
showing his handwriting, served to convict him for knowingly possessing the policy slips.
The Court said that it would "not stop to inquire as to the means by which the evidence
was obtained." Id. at 594.
0232 U.S. 383 (1914). A federal marshal with no warrant searched the defendant's
room and found papers linking him to a lottery. These papers were admitted into evidence
after a motion for return of the evidence had been refused.
i""To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest ne-
glect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution intended for the pro-
tection of the people against such unauthorized action." 232 U.S. at 394.
" Motion for Return of Property and to Suppress Evidence:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the
district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return
of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on
the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant, or
(2) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (3) the property seized is not
that described in the warrant, or (4) there was not probable cause for be-
lieving the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued, or
(5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge shall receive evidence on
any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is
granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful de-
tention [as in cases of contraband such as narcotics] and it shall not be
admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial. The motion to suppress evidence
may also be made in the district where the trial is to be had. The motion
shall be made before trial or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not
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Rules of Criminal Procedure."2 The rule is, however, merely a rule
of procedure in the federal courts; hence, although the fourth
amendment itself applies to the states through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the exclusionary rule, a means of
implementing the fourth amendment protection, does not apply to
the states.1" Moreover, until June 27, 1960, the rule did not operate
to exclude from federal criminal trials evidence illegally obtained
by state officers 4 unless they were accompanied by co-operating
federal officers.1' This principle, characterized as the "silver platter
doctrine," has been overruled; thus, evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment by state or local officers is now inadmissible
in a federal criminal trial." However, evidence which has been
stolen by private persons presumably remains admissible.'
On the theory that the rights protected by the fourth amend-
ment are personal, the lower federal courts previously limited the
application of the exclusionary rule through their requirement of
standing." As a prerequisite to a successful motion to suppress, the
exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but
the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e). In the instant case Defendant's motion was based on (4) and
(5). Supra note 3.
" Reynard, The Right of Privacy, Fundamental Law in Criminal Prosecutions 105
(Harding ed. 1959).
" Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). This result has been severely criticized.
Comment, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1304 (1951).
See generally Ray, Restrictions on the Use of Illegally Obtained Evidence, 9 Sw. L.J. 434,
438 n.22 (1955). For the Texas rule in this regard see Ray, supra, at 440-42. See also
Recent Case Note, 11 Sw. L.J. 523 (1957).
14 Rowan v. United States, 281 Fed. 137 (5th Cir. 1922).
" Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28
(1927). See generally Ray, supra note 13, at 436 n.15.
1"Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960). Justice Frankfurter, with Justices Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker, dissented in
both decisions. 364 U.S. at 233.
'
7 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
18 Every circuit has so held. E.g., Nunes v. United States, 23 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.
1928); Klein v. United States, 14 F.2d 35, 36 (Ist Cir. 1926); United States v. Pepe,
247 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Chieppa, 241 F.2d 635, 638 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 973 (1957); Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F.2d 290,
293 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 759 (1937); Mabee v. United States, 60 F.2d 209,
212 (3d Cir. 1932); Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236, 237-39 (4th Cir. 1946);
Kitt v. United States, 132 F.2d 920, 921-22 (4th Cir. 1942); Parr v. United States, 255
F.2d 86, 88-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 824 (1958); Lovette v. United States,
230 F.2d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 1956); Gowling v. United States, 64 F.2d 796, 799 (6th
Cir. 1933); Holt v. United States, 42 F.2d 103, 105 (6th Cir. 1930); United States v.
Eversole, 209 F.2d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1954); United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 361,
365 (7th Cir. 1951); Schnitzer v. United States, 77 F.2d 233, 235 (8th Cir. 1935);
Brown v. United States, 61 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1932); Kwong How v. United
States, 71 F.2d 71, 75 (9th Cir. 1934); Nixon v. United States, 36 F.2d 316, 317
(9th Cir. 1929); Baskerville v. United States, 227 F.2d 454, 456 (10th Cir. 1955);
Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754, 756-57 (10th Cir. 1955); Accardo v. United
States, 247 F.2d 568, 569-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 898 (1957); Gibson
v. United States, 149 F.2d 381, 384 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945).
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courts generally required that the movant claim "some proprietary
or possessory interest in the premises searched or the property
seized."" Thus, corporate officers"' and employees in apparent con-
trol of the premises" were denied standing to suppress evidence.
However, the "owner, lessee or lawful occupant" was held to have
sufficient interest to satisfy the requirement of standing." Some
courts included anyone lawfully present on the premises searched"
amid suggestions of broader possibilities for the satisfaction of the
standing requirement" even to the extent of "connection with the
premises searched or property seized."" s As an alternative to the
requirements with respect to the premises searched, the lower federal
courts demanded that the defendant affirmatively claim possession
of the seized articles in order to acquire standing;" thus, in cases
where possession was the main ingredient of the crime, the defendant
was compelled to choose between his right against self-incrimination
under the fifth amendment and his right to be secure from unlaw-
ful search.' Prior to the principal case the Supreme Court had never
considered the requirement of standing imposed by the lower federal
courts;" however, the Court had held that the protection of the
exclusionary rule extended to a guest when co-defendant with the
owner of the premises searched" or to guests living on the premises.2 '
See generally for perhaps the most thorough treatment of the problem Edwards, Standing
to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 471 (1952).
"E.g., Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282, 288 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 921 (1955); Washington v. United States, 202 F.2d 214, 215 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 956 (1953); Gorland v. United States, 197 F.2d 685, 686 (D.C. Cir.
1952); In re Nassetta, 125 F.2d 924, 925 (2d Cir. 1942). The rule was adverted to in
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
"Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245, 246 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 858 (1947) (sole officer and stockholder).
21E.g., United States v. Conoscente, 63 F.2d 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
642 (1933); Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.).
"2Coon v. United States, 36 F.2d 164, 165 (10th Cir. 1929).
"Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58, 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1931); Stakich v. United
States, 24 F.2d 701, 702 (9th Cit. 1928).
24 E.g., Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615, 617 (10th Cir. 1952) ("dominion
and control"); Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892, 895 (8th Cir. 1933) ("They
neither owned, leased, controlled, occupied, possessed, nor had any interest .... ");
McMillan v. United States, 26 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1928) ("dominion"); United
States v. De Bousi, 32 F.2d 902, 903 (D. Mass. 1929) ("lessee or licensee").
" Eberhart v. United States, 262 F.2d 421, 422 n.l (9th Cir. 1958). This language
apparently originated in a headnoter's imagination. Compare headnote 4 of Goldberg v.
United States, 297 Fed. 98 (5th Cir. 1924), with the text at 101.
"This dilemma was imposed on the defendant in a number of cases of which the
leading example is Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand,
J.). Likewise in the instant case. Note 4 supra.
"'Edwards, supra note 18, at 487; Recent Case, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 728, 729 (1949).
"Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942).
"McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948), noted, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev.
728 (1949).
30Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) (per curiam).
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Moreover, a defendant with the right to use the hotel room of
another had been allowed standing to suppress evidence seized
there; however, the defendant also claimed ownership of the seized
property."
The Court in the instant case has at last established a clear and
practical definition of standing. Although the requirement of stand-
ing will be continued," it will no longer rest on the niceties of
property law, hairline distinctions between "lessee," "licensee," "in-
vitee," and "guest"; instead, "anyone legitimately on the premises
where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion
to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him."'3
The Court held that "gossamer strength" technicalities were in-
appropriate "in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to con-
stitutional safeguards."' 4 Although the Court's ruling expands the
fourth amendment protection beyond the limited scope of a hyper-
technical interpretation of the language, the holding is consonant
with the current development of the law. The Court has already
rejected the "licensee," "invitee" distinction in the law of maritime
torts," and that same distinction is growing in disfavor in the law
of torts generally." Even in the homeland of the common law, such
distinctions are being discarded.' The Court accomplished the elimi-
nation of the possession dilemma by simply construing rule 41 (e)3
to prohibit such a contradictory assertion of power by the Govern-
ment" and thus avoided any necessity of considering a potential
compulsory abandonment of the constitutional guarantee against
self-incrimination. The Court, by thus construing rule 41 (e), main-
tained consistency with the policy involved in rejecting the "li-
censee," "invitee" distinction."
The basic purpose of the fourth amendment was to protect the
"United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). It has been suggested that the case
involved an inroad into the requirement of standing. Case Note, 25 So. Cal. L. Rev. 364
(1952); Recent Case, 28 Wash. L. Rev. 56 (1953).
" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 n.16 (1960).
33362 U.S. at 267.
34Id. at 266.
3 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-32 (1959).
" See Harper, Licensor-Licensee, Tweedledum-Tweedledee, 25 Conn. B.J. 123, 133-34
(1951).
'"See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31.
3 Note 11 supra.
39362 U.S. at 264.
40 "[W]e are dealing with .. . an important social policy and not a narrow, finicky
procedural requirement. This . . . policy . . . precludes application of the Rule so as
to compel . .. injustice . Ibid.
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individual's right of privacy"' from abuse by society's interest in
the prompt and effective apprehension of criminals." Whether the
exclusionary rule is the best method for effecting this purpose has
been the subject of prolonged controversy," but no other adequate
sanction against unconstitutional police conduct has been found."
The expanded concept of standing enunciated by the Court is in
harmony with the policy of the exclusionary rule and is undoubtedly
appropriate to the highly interrelated life of modern society. The
Court must not be restricted to a meticulous application of common-
law principles 5 if the protections afforded by the Constitution are
to have real meaning. A man must be as secure in the home of a
friend as he is in his own, for the exigencies of modern society no
longer permit a man to wall himself up within his own "castle."
Twentieth-century man expects his right of privacy to be pro-
tected regardless of where he is as long as he is rightfully there;
if the constitutional guarantees are to have operational relevance to
our society, then the court has done only what it must do in again
applying pragmatic natural law."
Robert C. L. Moffat
Estate Taxation-Community Property-Life Insurance
on Surviving Husband
Surviving Husband was insured by several life insurance policies
which were purchased with community funds. Husband retained
the right to change the beneficiaries and to obtain the cash value of
" Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 453 (1948); 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 610, 611 (8th ed. 1927) ("every
man's house is his castle"); Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Improving Federal Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, S. Rep. No. 1478, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
14 (1958) ("Freedom from the sudden, unjustified 'knock on the door' is a most precious
liberty.").
*2Reynard, op. cit. supra note 12, at 117. Cf., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 149 (1924).
43 Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 133 (1949). For an excellent summary of the argu-
ments pro and con and a collection of authorities see Ray, supra note 13, at 438-40 and
nn. 23-29. Compare 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3d ed. 1940) with Atkinson, Ad-
missibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 Colum.
L. Rev. 11 (1925).
"4Glueck, Crime and Justice 73, 74 (1936); Recent Case, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1002,
1003 (1951); Note, 14 Colum. L. Rev. 338 (1914).
" Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. Cal. L. Rev. 364 (1952).
""Rightness or justice of law is not just a matter of form. . . . Such an approach
permits law and constitution to grow to meet new problems. Natural law can be prag-
matic and empirical, based upon the basic needs and drives and capacities of men, and
the building of a good society. It is this pragmatic natural law which Justices Cardozo
and Frankfurter sought to describe." Harding, Due Process: A Natural Law for Criminal
Prosecutions?, Fundamental Law in Criminal Prosecutions 22 (1959).
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the policies. Wife endorsed the designation of beneficiaries on some
of the policies. Upon Wife's death Husband sued for refund of
federal estate taxes which were paid on decedent Wife's interest in
the life insurance policies. The trial court held for Husband on the
ground that Wife had no vested interest at her death, but a mere
"right of protection" which was contingent upon her surviving the
husband; therefore, her estate was not subject to an estate tax on
one-half the value of the policies. Held: Reversed and Remanded.
(1) A wife's one-half interest in insurance policies on the life of the
husband purchased with community funds is includable in her gross
estate for estate tax purposes. (2) A wife's endorsement of the
designation by the husband of beneficiaries under insurance policies
on the husband's life does not constitute relinquishment of the wife's
one-half community interest in the policies. United States v. Stewart,
270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960).
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the value of the gross
estate of a decedent is determined by including the value of all
property to the extent of the decedent's interest therein at the time
of death.! The estate tax is levied upon the privilege of transferring
property at death, and the tax is on the interest that ceases at death.'
The property concepts of the individual states are determinative of
the extent of a decedent's interest in the property.' Thus, in com-
munity property states one-half of all property acquired by spouses
during marriage other than by gift, devise, or descent is includable
in the gross estate of a deceased spouse.! Moreover, when community
funds are used to pay the premiums on life insurance policies, the
policies' and cash surrender value' are considered community proper-
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §5 2031, 2033. This case does not come under § 2042 of
the Int. Rev. Code of 1954. The facts of the present case came under Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 811(a).
'Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 1941); Bethea v. Sheppard,
143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref. This is thus distinguished from an
inheritance tax.
'Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938); Thurman, Federal Estate and Gift
Taxation of Community Property Life Insurance, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 239, 245 (1957).
'Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 913 (1959); In re Hansen's Estate, 91 Cal. App.2d 610, 205 P.2d 686 (1949);
Bell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 278 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.;
Tex. Const. art. 16, § 15; In re Allen's Estate, 54 Wash.2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959).
' Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933); In re Castagnola's
Estate, 68 Cal. App. 732, 230 Pac. 188 (1924); Anderson v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n,
77 Idaho 373, 292 P.2d 760 (1956). In Texas, policy rights, e.g., cash surrender value, as
distinguished from proceed rights, are community property; see Commissioner v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, supra note 4, for an excellent discussion on this. Womack v. Womack,
141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307 (1943); Cox v. Cox, 304 S.W.2d 175, 177, 178 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957).
6 Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
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ty. This interest has been construed by the Treasury Department to
be one-half of the value of the policy.'
Prior to the principal case, federal courts failed to reach harmoni-
ous results on the question of whether the wife's interest in com-
munity insurance on the life of the husband is includable in her
gross estate where the wife predeceases the husband. In 1933 the
Board of Tax Appeals, applying Louisiana community property
concepts, held that one-half of the cash surrender value of policies
on the life of the husband was includable in the wife's gross estate.'
However, in United States v. Waechter' the Ninth Circuit reached
a contrary conclusion on the basis of a determination by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court" that the wife's one-half interest in the cash
surrender values of similar policies was not subject to the state in-
heritance tax. Federal district courts of California reached conflicting
determinations on the includability in the wife's gross estate of
one-half of the cash surrender value of community insurance poli-
cies on the husband's life where the wife predeceased the husband.
In California Trust Co. v. Riddell1" the District Court for the South-
ern District of California held that the interest was includable in the
wife's gross estate. However, in the principal case, the District Court
for the Northern District of California reached a contrary con-
clusion on the ground that since the wife had nothing in the policies
which could be transferred to her heirs, the interest was not includ-
able.12
The court in the principal case resolved the conflict between the
federal district courts in California by reversing the determination
of the district court for the Northern District of California and
holding that the wife's interest in the policies was includable in her
gross estate.1" The court reasoned: (1) The decision of the lower
court was based upon the determination of the Ninth Circuit in the
Waechter" case, and (2) the Washington Supreme Court had over-
726 C.F.R. S 20.2042-1 (c) (5) (rev. 1960).
'Estate of Louisa M. Carroll, 29 B.T.A. 11 (1933); 26 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1 (a) (5)
(rev. 1960); Rev. Rule 48, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 392; Benjamin and Pigman, Federal Estate
and Gift Taxation of Louisiana Life Insurance, 28 Tul. L. Rev. 75 (1953).
9 195 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1952), affirming 98 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1951).
10 1n re Knight's Estate, 31 Wash.2d 813, 199 P.2d 89 (1948).
11 136 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Cal. 1955). This is the only California case analogous to
the principal case.
12 158 F. Supp. 25.
" Stewart v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1957), rev'd, 270 F.2d 894
(9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960). The principal case supports Mr.
Thurman's article, Federal Estate & Gift Taxation, 1 Ariz. L. Rev. 253, at 272 (1959).
14 Waechter v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d
963 (9th Cir. 1952).
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ruled the decision" upon which the Waechter case was based.1" It
would appear to this writer that in view of this reasoning, the case
of United States v. Waechter" is at most a very doubtful holding. 8
Moreover, the court in the principal case pointed out that the lower
court had overlooked a controlling fact, viz., although the cash
surrender value would remain community property if the husband
claimed it prior to the death of the wife, the husband became the
sole owner of the cash surrender value where he claimed it after the
wife's death. Thus, the right to one-half of the cash surrender value
of the policies passed to the husband upon the death of the wife.1"
Because of the determination that the wife's one-half interest in
community insurance on the life of the husband was includable
in the wife's gross estate, the court in the principal case was faced
with the issue of whether the wife's endorsement of the husband's
designation of beneficiaries constituted a gift of her interest. The
court concluded that the wife's endorsement did not constitute a
divestiture of the wife's interest in the policies."9 The court reasoned
that the wife could not by endorsing a designation of beneficiaries
by the husband have intended to relinquish her interest in the policies
as distinguished from her right to the proceeds. Moreover, the court
pointed out that where the insured designates a beneficiary but re-
tains the right to change the designation, the interest of the bene-
ficiaries prior to the death of the insured is that of a mere expectancy
of an incompleted gift. Therefore, the wife's endorsement of the
designation of beneficiaries was at most an assent to an incompleted
gift, which was still incomplete at the time of her death and was
not a transfer to her husband."
It would seem that the result of the principal case will be reached
if a similar case arises concerning estate taxation of Texas community
life insurance. In Texas, when the life insurance policy premiums
on the life of a surviving husband are paid out of community funds
and the husband retains the right to change the beneficiary, one-
"In re Knight's Estate, 31 Wash.2d 813, 199 P.2d 89 (1948).
"eIn re Leuthold's Estate, 52 Wash.2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103 (1958), wherein it was
held that the death of the wife is a taxable event which passes her half of the community
interest in the cash surrender value of the policies to her legatees and is therefore subject
to an inheritance tax.
" 195 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1952), affirming 98 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1951).
"8 The writer's view is also based on the excellent discussion of the Waechter case by
Mr. Thurman in his law review article. See Thurman, supra note 3, at 270. It would
therefore seem that the result of the principal case should be reached when a similar case
arises concerning estate taxation of Washington community life insurance.
"270 F.2d at 898, 899; In re Leuthold's Estate, 52 Wash.2d 299, 324 P.2d 1103
(1958).




half of the cash surrender value of the policies passes on death to
the surviving husband and is subject to the state inheritance tax."
The wife owns a present vested interest in the community property."
In view of the reasoning that the wife at death possesses a one-half
vested interest in the cash surrender value of a community property
life insurance policy, there would seem to be no reason to deny an
estate tax on the transfer of the interest at her death. The principal
case is in accord with the principles of estate taxation of other com-
munity property, and because of the states' view of life insurance
as community property, no justifiable reason is seen why the courts
should vary these principles with regard to life insurance.
With respect to the court's ruling that the wife's endorsement of
the beneficiary change constituted no surrender of her rights to the
cash surrender value of the policies, this holding seems to be based
on the difference in policy-rights and proceed-rights.4 In Ettlinger
v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.' the wife had been held to re-
linquish her right to the proceeds of community life insurance by
signing a request for a change of beneficiary. The court there rea-
soned that since the husband could change the beneficiary without
the wife's consent in writing, and since the only thing he could not
do was make a gift of her community interest without her written
consent, there could be no other reason for her signing the request.
The principal case limits the rule of the Ettlinger case to a surrender
of the proceeds. This writer would limit the principal case rule to
its own fact situation. No reason is seen why a wife could not divest
herself of her interest in the policies, so long as she clearly manifests
such an intention. " It is submitted that the court in the principal
"Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
"Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) (Texas law); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S.
101 (1930) (Washington law); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930) (Louisiana law);
Anderson v. Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 77 Idaho 373, 292 P.2d 760 (1956).
'" Insurance consists originally of rights in a policy-lifetime rights-and later of
rights in the proceeds; policy (lifetime) rights include the rights to the cash surrender
value and all other rights except the right to the proceeds. Commissioner v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 245, 246 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
This case contains an excellent discussion of the difference in policy-rights and proceed-
rights. Also, this case gives an excellent analysis of Texas community property law on
insurance rights, pp. 244-52.
25175 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1949); see Mayr v. Arana, 133 Cal. App.2d 471, 284 P.2d
21 (1955).
"6 In Silen v. Silen, 44 Wash.2d 884, 271 P.2d 674 (1954), a wife had, in a supple-
mental agreement, stipulated that she (wife) released her community interest in two life
insurance policies and that such policies were to become the property of her husband.
The court there held that the wife had divested herself of her community interest in the
policies. Although it is beyond the scope of this casenote, there is some uncertainty among
lawyers in Texas as to how a wife can give away her one-half interest in community
property in view of the fact that the wife ordinarily has no managerial control over the
community property. In order to circumvent this uncertainty, Texas lawyers use the
[Vol. 14
RECENT CASE NOTES
case merely held that endorsement by a wife of a change in benefi-
ciary, while enough evidence of an intention to divest herself of her
community interest in the proceeds, is not enough evidence to mani-
fest an intention to surrender her community interest in the policies.
However, if the intention of the wife is clear, she should be en-
titled to surrender her community interest in the policies as well as
in the proceeds."' The wife has the right to give away her interest
in other community property, and no reason is seen why a different
rule should apply to life insurance.
Todd H. Overton
Federal Procedure - Claim of Right - Severance of
Claim of Right
Plaintiff, a subcontractor, and his surety brought suit against
Defendant, a contractor, for the earnings under the subcontract.
Prior to the day set for the trial, Plaintiff submitted amended
pleadings alleging additional damages for wrongfully delaying pay-
ment to Plaintiff, which delay forced Plaintiff to default and his
surety to complete the work. The trial judge denied this amend-
ment because it would have necessitated a continuance. After a
recovery was granted in the original suit for earnings under the
contract, the present suit was brought for damages caused by De-
fendant's delayed payment. Defendant contended that Plaintiff was
barred by res judicata from pursuing another action for damages.
Held: The rights to recover for earnings under a contract and for
damages for delaying payment constitute two causes of action which
indirect method of the husband assigning community life insurance to the wife thus
making it her separate property and subject to her control, and then the wife assigning
it back to the husband thereby accomplishing a relinquishment of her one-half interest.
Article 4619 (6), effective May 30, 1959, makes it clear that the wife can, by such an
assignment, relinquish her rights in the community life insurance policy. The statute clearly
gives the wife, even without the joinder, participation, or consent of her husband, the
right to full control, management, and disposition of any contract of life insurance or
annuity to the extent provided by the contract or any assignment thereof. However, this
right of the wife can be defeated if the husband elects to give notice to the insurance
company that he does not desire this section of the statute to apply to his wife, where-
upon this section will not apply to any transaction by or with the wife subsequent to
the furnishing of such notice. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (6) (1959). It would
seem, therefore, that if the husband elects to revoke her rights under this section, the
original uncertainty is revived.
" Although it is beyond the scope of this casenote, one should consider that there is
always the possibility that a wife's gift or assignment of her community interest will
be found to be a gift in contemplation of death (at least where her death occurs soon
after the gift), and under section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 will be
includable in her gross estate.
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may be prosecuted in separate suits. Ross v. Bateson Constr. Co., 270
F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1959).
A "cause of action"' is identified with the infringement of a right
or violation of a duty; however, it also denotes a "unit of griev-
ance"' or a law of remedies. ' These conflicting definitions of a cause
of action prompted the substitution' of the "claim of relief" doctrine
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.! The "claim of relief" is
defined as the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right
enforceable in the courts.' The doctrine is based on a broader, more
liberal and flexible theory than the old rigid common-law cause of
action.! The change by the federal rules from the old cause of action
to the new claim of relief concept caused difficulty in the applica-
tion of the common-law tenets of res judicata and "splitting" a
cause of action." Consequently, liberal standards" are provided for
the division of claims without res judicata barring the subsequent
suit."
Under rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, claims
may be tried separately" (1) to avoid confusing the jury and the
'United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62 (1933); F.O. Day Co. v.
Shapiro, 267 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Clark, Code Pleading §§ 19, 114 (ist ed. 1928);
Schopflocker, What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res
Judicata, 21 Ore. L. Rev. 319 (1942).
'Smith v. Dulles, 352 U.S. 955 (1956); F.O. Day Co. v. Shapiro, supra note 1.
'Clark, Code Pleading § 19, at 130 (2d ed. 1947).4 F.O. Day Co. v. Shapiro, 267 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1959). But see United States v.
Smelser, 87 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1937); Dennision v. Payne, 293 Fed. 333 (2d Cir. 1923);
Nichols, Federal Procedure § 12.158 (1952).
a Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex. 1957); Ivancik v.
Wright Aeronautical Corp., 68 F. Supp. 270 (D. N.J. 1946); Nichols, op. cit. supra
note 4, at § 14.157.
'Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Also see Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d
358 (9th Cir. 1955); Sidebotham v. Robison, 216 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1954).
'United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62 (1933); Original Ballet Russe
v. Ballet Theatre, 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943); Clark, op. cit. supra note 3, at 55
19, 70; 1 Moore, Federal Practice §§ 0.01, 2.04 (1938).
'United States v. Employing Plasterers' Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); Enger-Kress Co.
v. Amity Leather Prod. Co., 18 F.R.D. 347 (E.D. Wis. 1955); Cromer v. Sollitt Constr.
Co., 16 F.R.D. 559 (S.D. W.Va. 1954); Clark, Special Pleading in the Big Case, 21
F.R.D. 45 (1957).
'Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 204 (D. Neb. 1957); Smith v.
Brown, 17 F.R.D. 39 (M.D. Pa. 1955); 5 Moore, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 42; Walder
v. Paramount Publix Corp., 23 Fed. Rules Serv. 15a.3 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
'°Enger-Kress Co. v. Amity Leather Prod. Co., 18 F.R.D. 347 (E.D. Wis. 1955);
Cromer v. Sollitt Constr. Co., 16 F.R.D. 559 (S.D. W.Va. 1954).
"Deauville Corp. v. Garden Suburbs Golf & Country Club, Inc., 164 F.2d 430 (5th
Cir. 1947); Milner v. National Airlines, 23 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1958); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 18, 42, 54; Note, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 743 (1955).
" It should be noted that rule 18, which provides for "Joinder of Claims and Reme-
dies," is consistent with the application of rule 42. However, it would be desirable as
a procedural expedient if rule 18 were amended to require compulsory joinder of all
related claims. This amendment would not affect the discretionary power of the courts
to sever certain cases under rule 42. Moreover, it would eliminate the present type of case
which is based on an incorrect original severance.
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court, (2) to conform to requisites of procedural necessity or con-
venience, or (3) to prevent prejudice to parties." If one of the
above is not present, the overwhelming majority of cases consolidate
all claims of relief arising out of the same transaction 4 and conform
to the basic tenets of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.,
consolidation, expedience, and flexibility." However, rule 42 is
permissive;"s hence, the court has discretion to decide whether a suit
involving several claims should be severed or remain consolidated.
Multiple injuries to persons and property arising out of a single
tort," breach of copyright and unfair competition, 9 infringement of
patent and unfair competition,"2 breach of contract and fraud," and
wrongful cancelation of a franchise contract and conspiracy to re-
strain interstate trade"2 have all been held to constitute only a single
primary right for which there should be recovery in a single suit.
However, if a plaintiff fails to allege all portions of the claim of
relief in the original petition, the courts have been liberal in allow-
ing amended pleadings which incorporate all of the claims in a
single suit."
The court in the instant case based its decision on the fact that
if relief were not granted, Plaintiff would have lost "his day in
court" through no fault of his own. 4 Thus, it would seem that the
court realized that the action taken in the first suit was not entirely
correct. However, the court relied on the old concept of cause of
action" and ignored the modern federal trend of combining all
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.
14Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283 (1942); Deauville Corp. v. Garden Suburbs Golf
& Country Club, Inc., 164 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1947); Mendez & Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 161 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1947); Atwater v. North Am. Coal Corp., 1II F.2d
125 (2d Cir. 1940); Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.
1939); Woburn Degreasing Co. v. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, 37 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. N.Y.
1941); Milner v. National Airlines, 23 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1958); Temp-Resisto Corp.
v. Glatt, 18 F.R.D. 148 (D. N.J. 1955); Smith v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 39 (M.D. Pa.
1955); Fed. R. Civ. P. 18; 1 Moore, op. cit. supra note 7, at 42.
"Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., supra note 14; Enger-Kress Co. v. Amity
Leather Prod. Co., 18 F.R.D. 347 (E.D. Wis. 1955).
"Fed. R. Civ. P. 42.
" Mendez & Co. v. General Motors Corp., 161 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1947); Eichinger
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 204 (D. Neb. 1957); Walder v. Paramount
Publix Corp., 23 Fed. Rules Serv. 15a.3 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
"s Cormier v. Highway Trucking Co., 312 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Annot.,
62 A.L.R.2d 980 (1958).
"Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
"°Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943).
" Original Ballet Russe v. Ballet Theater, 133 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1943).
"2Mendez & Co. v. General Motors Corp., 161 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1947).
" Clark, op. cit. supra note 3, at 319.
24 270 F.2d at 800.
5Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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claims for relief in a single action."6 Although the liberal context
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for division of
claims under certain circumstances," the court failed to cite any of
these rules for its decision. Moreover, the court determined that two
causes of action arose out of the contract. This decision was based
on secondary authority which is not supported by modern federal
procedure. s If a secondary authority were necessary, it would seem
that the Restatement of Judgments would have supported the de-
cision more adequately. The Restatement provides that if a prior
court incorrectly rules that two claims must be severed, res judicata
will not constitute a bar to the subsequent suit." A similar case in-
volving a contract right and a federal law, Mendez & Co. v. General
Motors Corp.,"° held that all claims arising out of a contract right
should be tried in a single suit. However, in the Mendez case the
plaintiff failed to bring the multiple claims arising out of the con-
tract in a single suit; in the principal case the court refused Plaintiff's
request to bring both claims in one suit.
Although the result reached in the principal case is an equitable
one, the court could have supported its decision more adequately by
utilizing the discretion granted by rule 42 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. However, it is possible that the lower court refused
to allow the amendment to the pleadings because it presented an
issue of special damages which required specific pleading."s If the
amended claim was for special damages and the amendment failed
to plead them specifically, then the lower court was correct in dis-
2It should be noted that a true anomaly in the law develops at this point. A well
settled principle of federal law and procedure is that when a case is brought into a federal
court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, the rules of decision, both written and un-
written, of the slate shall be the governing law. Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938); United States v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 130 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
However, some states, Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 977, 1001 (1958), allow two suits to be
maintained for harm to the person and damages to the property arising out of a single
act. Clancey v. McBride, 338 I11. 35, 169 N.E. 729 (1929); Public Serv. Co. v. Dalbey,
119 Ind. App. 495, 85 N.E.2d 368 (1949); Carter v. Hinkle, 189 Va. 1, 52 S.E.2d 135
(1949). Thus, when a suit was brought to the federal courts from one of the above
states recognizing two causes of action, the modern trend of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure proclaiming only one "claim of relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), would either
have to be compromised to allow two federal claims, or the federal procedure would have
to be declared the supreme governing law.
27 Deauville Corp. v. Garden Suburbs Golf & Country Club, Inc., 164 F.2d 430 (5th
Cir. 1947); Milner v. National Airlines, 23 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1958); Fed. R. Civ. P.
18, 42, 54; Note, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 743 (1955).
" See Harris v. Whitworth, 213 Ark. 480, 211 S.W.2d 101 (1948); Chicago & S.E.
Ry. v. Yawger, 24 Ind. App. 460, 56 N.E. 50 (1900); 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 674
(1947). Note that neither case was based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
" Restatement, Judgments § 67 (1942).
30161 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1947).
2" Fed. R. Civ. P. 9g.
[Vol. 14
RECENT CASE NOTES
allowing the amendment."' Moreover, in the principal case the court
could have emphasized that the first suit was truly a controversy
between Defendant and the surety by reason of the surety's subroga-
tion to Plaintiff's right of compensation when he completed the con-
tract. Based on this theory, the court could have divided the claim
of relief so that the surety would recover from Defendant in one
suit for the costs of completing the contract, and Plaintiff could
recover damages in another suit for Defendant's causing Plaintiff
to default. However, even this approach would be time consuming
and contrary to the modern theory of the federal rules, viz., settling
all claims arising out of a factual situation in a single suit.
Ronald Ed-ward Griesheimer
Federal Procedure - Removal of Cases - Right of
Federal Officer to Remove as Third-Party Defendant
Plaintiff, a resident of Texas, brought an action in a state court
against Defendant, a Texas contractor, for faulty construction of
Plaintiff's home. Defendant impleaded as a third-party defendant
the Administrator of Veteran's Affairs on the basis of the third
party's authorization of the faulty construction. The Administrator
removed the case to the federal district court under 28 U.S.C.A. §
1442.' The federal judge dismissed the suit as to the third-party
defendant and remanded the remainder of the suit to the state court.
The original Defendant appealed. Held: Dismissed for lack of ap-
pellate jurisdiction. A federal officer who is a third-party defendant
in a state court action but against whom no separate and independent
claim is asserted may not remove the case to a federal court.' West-
wood Dev. Co. v. Higley, 266 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1959).
"
5 Henry Pratt Co. v. Stoody Co., 16 F.R.D. 175 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
1 62 Stat. 938 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. 5 1442 (1950) provides for the removal of suits
by any federal officer or person acting thereunder for any act under color of his office
or in the performance of his duties.
' The principal case involves four basic problems, viz., (1) whether an order dismissing
a third-party action is reviewable when the remainder of the suit is ordered remanded to
the state court, City of Waco v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934);
(2) whether the third-party action was properly dismissed in view of the Rules' termi-
nology "is or may be liable," 63 Stat. 102 (1949), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (1950);
Gwaltney Bros. v. Marion County Bldg. Trades Council, 175 F. Supp. 790 (S.D. Ind.
1959); (3) whether a third-party defendant may remove under 62 Stat. 937 (1948),
28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) (1950); and (4) whether a federal officer who is a third-party
defendant may remove under 62 Stat. 938 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442 (1950). How-
ever, the court treated only the fourth issue. 266 F.2d at 558.
1960]
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The general removal statute provides two basic grounds for re-
moval of suits from state courts to federal courts, viz., (1) the
presence of a federal question' and (2) diversity of citizenship.!
Another statute specifically allows federal officers and members of
the armed forces to remove certain causes.' The rationale of the latter
removal statute is that the federal law is supreme; thus, federal
courts should prevent state law or policy from exerting adverse
control over officers of the federal government! As a prerequisite
to the removal of a suit by a federal officer, he must show that the
action against him arose while he was acting under "color of his
office" 7 and pursuant to federal laws.8 However, although courts
have tended to place a strict construction on the general removal
statute,' the federal officer removal statute has received a more liberal
interpretation." Similarly, Congress has gradually increased the right
of removal for federal officers and restricted the right under the
general removal statute."
Section 1441 (c) allows the removal to a federal district court of
an entire case where an independent claim which would be removable
if sued upon alone is joined with an otherwise non-removable claim
or cause of action. Three distinct problems arise under the sec-
tion when the party attempting removal is not the original party
defendant. First, removal of an entire suit is authorized only where
a62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(b) (1950); Note, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 101
(1952). A federal question is defined as "a claim . . . arising under the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States ... "
4 Mexican Nat'l R.R. v. Davidson, 157 U.S. 201 (1895); 62 Stat. 938 (1948), 28
U.S.C.A. § 1442(b) (1950).
'Sarner v. Mason, 228 F.2d 176 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 (1956);
62 Stat. 938 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442 (1950); Moore, Federal Practice 5 0.6(5)
(1959). Note that a federal officer may always remove under the general removal statute
if he complies with its requisites.
'Colorado v. Symes, 286 U.S. 510 (1932); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879);
Yeung v. Hawaii, 132 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1942); Jones v. Elliott, 94 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.
Va. 1950); Application of Shumpka, 268 Fed. 686 (N.D. N.Y. 1920).
7 Hood v. United States, 256 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1958); DeBusk v. Harvin, 212
F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1954); Moore, Federal Practice § 0.164(2) (to be published).
'Sarner v. Mason, 228 F.2d 176 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924 (1956);
People's United States Bank v. Goodwin, 162 Fed. 937 (E.D. Mo. 1908).
'Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Milton
Jacobs, Inc. v. Manning Mfg. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. N.Y. 1959); Continental
Carriers, Inc. v. Goodpasture, 169 F. Supp. 602 (M.D. Ga. 1959); Browne v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 168 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Moore, Federal Practice 5§ 0.156,
0.162(l) (to be published).
"°Ove Gustavasson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 176 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. N.Y. 1959);
Johnston v. Earle, 162 F. Supp. 149 (D. Ore. 1958); State v. Willingham, 143 F. Supp.
445 (E.D. Okla. 1956); Garden Homes v. Mason, 143 F. Supp. 144 (D. Mass. 1956);
Moore, Federal Practice 5 0.164(1) (to be published). Contra, Fink v. Gerrish, 149 F.
Supp. 915 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
"1People v. Banning, 88 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1950); Moore, Federal Practice
S 0.156, 0.162(1), 0.164(1) (to be published).
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there has been joinder of two or more claims or causes of action.'
"Joinder" has been interpreted to mean joinder exclusively by the
plaintiff.3 Second, a party seeking removal must present a "separate
and independent" claim, i.e., a claim that would be removable if
sued upon alone."4 However, courts have encountered difficulty in
enunciating a definition of a "separate and independent" claim.'"
Moreover, courts have been unable to determine how the claim of an
impleaded third party is separate and independent from the "inter-
locked series of transactions" which forms the entire suit."8 Noted
authorities have asserted that any third-party claim would be too
related to the main question of the controversy to meet the "separate
and independent" test." Third, under the strict construction ' of
the general removal statute"8 only "the defendant or the defendants"
may remove a suit.2 Thus, a cross-actioned or cross-claimed plaintiff
does not have sufficient standing as a cross-defendant to remove a
suit.2 Courts have conflicted in determining whether a third-party
defendant is a "defendant" within the purview of the general re-
moval statute." A few courts have continued to follow the stand
taken by the prior removal statute,3 viz., a third party is a defend-
ant for purposes of removal if his claim is "separable" from that of
the original parties. 4 Under a second view, no counterclaim, cross-
1262 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) (1950):
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which
would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more other-
wise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion,
may remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
Shaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Sequoyah
Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Moore, Com-
mentary on the United States Judicial Code § 0.03(37) (1949); Note, 51 Mich. L. Rev.
115 (1952). Contra, President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Assoc.,
81 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
"462 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) (1950).
"Aetna Ins. Co. v. City of Maldin, 102 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Mo. 1952).
" American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn., 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 748
(1951).
" Moore, op. cit. supra note 13.
is Bradley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 100 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Okla.
1951); Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, 98 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Mo. 1951).
'162 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1950). See generally, Note, 51 Mich.
L. Rev. 115 (1952).
20Mason City & Ft. D. R.R. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570 (1907).
'1 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100 (1941); West v. Aurora, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 139 (1867); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Benson Hardware Co., 225
Ala. 412, 143 So. 570 (1932).
25Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
Contra, Gregory v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 112 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. N.C. 1953).
2328 U.S.C.A. S 71 (1940).
4 Habermel v. Mong, 31 F.2d 822 (6th Cir. 1929); Henry v. Rice, 74 F. Supp. 222
(E.D. Mo. 1947); Ellis v. Peak, 22 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Tex. 1938). Also see Shaver v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. 171 F. Supp. 754 (W.D. Ark. 1959) reciting old law but
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claim, third-party claim, or intervention would afford the basis of
removal." On the other hand, a few courts have held that if a
removable claim is asserted against a third party, the third party
should have the right to remove. 8 However, the construction of
section 1441 does not apply to section 1442." Under the liberal
interpretation of section 1442,28 co-defendant federal officers were
entitled to remove the entire suit even though the other co-defend-
ant did not assent to the removal and none of the requisites of the
general removal statute were met." However, prior to the principal
case no court ever specifically ruled on the question of whether a
federal officer as a third-party defendant could remove under section
1442.30
The court in the instant case reasoned that no "separate and in-
dependent" claim has been stated; thus, the action was not remov-
able.' The court reached this conclusion by applying the strict
interpretation which courts have placed on the general removal
statute, section 1441. However, the third-party defendant, a federal
officer, never attempted to remove under section 1441; the right to
remove was asserted under the specific removal statute for federal
officers, section 1442." Thus, the court either (1) neglected to
notice which removal statute was actually in question, or (2) in-
terpreted section 1442 as being bound by the case-law construction
of section 1441. In either case, the court erroneously applied to
section 1442 the construction given section 1441. Section 1442 was
enacted for tle purpose of giving federal courts primary control
over federal officers" and allowing the officer the right of removal
not applying it: "Section 71 allowed removal when a controversy was wholly between
citizens of different states and fully determinable between them. Such a controversy was
said to be 'separable.'" American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn., 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Note, 41
Harv. L. Rev. 1048 (1928).
2sShaver v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.., supra note 24; McMahon v. City of Troy,
122 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. N.Y. 1954); Sequoyah Feed & Supply Co. v. Robinson, 101
F. Supp. 680 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Moore, op. cit. supra note 13. It would appear that
Professor Moore, as the originator of this interpretation, would so strictly construe section
1441 that only original parties defendant would have the opportunity to remove suits.
"TIndustrial Lithographic Co. v. Mendelsohn, 119 F. Supp. 284 (D. N.J. 1954);
Gregory v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 112 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. N.C. 1953); President
and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Monogram Assoc., 81 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. N.Y. 1949).
2aMoore, Federal Practice § 0.164(1) (to be published).
2 Potts v. Elliot, 61 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Ky. 1945).
2"Jones v. Elliot, 94 F. Supp. 567 (E.D. Va. 1950).
"5Goldfarb v. Muller, 181 F. Supp. 41 (D. N.J. 1959). In the opinion the court
quoted in dictum the statement by the United States Attorney General in his brief for
Oklahoma v. Willingham, 143 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Okla. 1956), that a third-party de-
fendant federal officer should under the liberal context of section 1442 be allowed the
right of removal.
3"266 F.2d 555, 558.
2 2 6 6 F.2d 555, 556.
"Horne v. Aderhold, I F. Supp. 690 (M.D. Ga. 1932).
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to prevent state courts from attempting to control federal officers."
Neither section 1442"' nor any cases" arising under the statute in-
dicates that a federal officer is bound by the requirements of the
general removal statute. Hence, the requisites for removal by a third-
party defendant under the general removal statute"7 should not
apply where the third-party defendant is a federal officer.
It is well settled that while the ultimate purpose of both sections
1441 and 1442 is to allow removal of suits from state courts to
federal courts, the statutes were enacted for two different classes
of people and based on different rationale. The standards and
criteria for applying one statute cannot apply to the other if their
specific purposes are to be achieved. To require that a federal officer,
sued while acting under color of office, must comply with the
"lseparate and independent cause of action" test is as incorrect as a
requirement that a federal officer must fulfill the diversity of citizen-
ship test in order to remove a suit. If the instant case is a new inter-
pretation of the removal statutes, the conclusion must follow that
the two removal statutes are to be construed together and that the
strict requirements of the general removal statute have supplanted
the liberal treatment granted to federal officers. Such a trend will
ultimately extinguish the entire benefit of removal for federal
officers.
Ronald Edward Griesheimer
Oil and Gas- Leases?--Paying Quantities Under
Habendum Clause
Plaintiff was the lessor of an oil, gas, and mineral lease in which the
habendum clause provided that the lease should continue beyond
the primary term for so long as oil or gas was produced; another
clause stipulated that reworking operations might be begun within
sixty days following the cessation of production. Plaintiff brought
an action to cancel the lease on the ground that the only well on
the property in question had ceased to produce in paying quantities
more than sixty days prior to the commencement of successful re-
"
4Application of Shumpka, 268 Fed. 686 (N.D. N.Y. 1920).
3562 Stat. 938 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1442 (1950); Note, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 101
(1952).
" Venable v. Richards, 105 U.S. 636 (1882); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879);
Johnston v. Earle, 162 F. Supp. 149 (D. Ore. 1958); Garden Homes v. Mason, 143 F.
Supp. 144 (D. Mass. 1956).
" Aetna Ins. Co. v. City of Maiden, 102 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Mo. 1952); Henry v.
Rice, 74 F. Supp. 222 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
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working operations. The evidence showed that the well had an op-
erating loss for several consecutive months prior to the reworking
operations, but that a small profit was made over a fifteen month
period prior to the cutoff date. Plaintiff contended that the lease
terminated at a point in time sixty days after production in paying
quantities had ceased; however, Defendant, the lessee, maintained
that a reasonable time must be taken into account. Defendant also
sought to exclude from his operating costs depreciation and overrid-
ing royalties and contended that the Texas Railroad Commission's
proration rules must be taken into account. Held: Affirmed for De-
fendant. (1) The standard by which paying quantities is determined
is whether under all the circumstances a reasonably prudent operator
would, for the purpose of making a profit and not for mere specu-
lation, continue to operate a well in the manner in which it is being
operated; and the trial court shall consider all relevant facts and
circumstances and a reasonable period of time. (2) Depreciation
expenses and overriding royalties are not deductible as operating ex-
penses in determining paying quantities. Clifton v. Koontz, -Tex.
-, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959).2
When a habendum clause in an oil, gas, or mineral lease provides
that the lease shall continue during the primary term and so long
thereafter as oil or gas is produced, the estate created and held by
the lessee after the primary term is a determinable fee.' Thus, the
lease is automatically terminated if production ceases after the pri-
mary term' in the absence of other circumstances extending the
lease, e.g., payment of a shut-in royalty in appropriate circum-
stances.' The word "produced" in the habendum clause is construed
by the great majority of the courts to mean substantially the same
as "produced in paying quantities.''' According to the prevailing
view, production in paying quantities during the primary term is
a condition precedent to the continuation of the lease;' mere dis-
covery of oil or gas is not sufficient.! Marketing of the product with-
in a reasonable time after drilling has been completed, however, has
' See Recent Case Note, 14 Sw. L.J. 283 (1960), for a discussion of the issue of the
implied covenant to develop in the principal case. See also Comment, 14 Sw. L.J. 365
(1960).
aWaggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929).
'Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 155 S.W.2d 783 (1941).4 Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943).
'Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942); 2 Summers, Oil and Gas
293 (1959). There is, however, some contrary authority. See Gillespie v. Ohio Oil
Co., 260 Ill. 169, 102 N.E. 1043 (1913); Enfield v. Woods, 198 Ky. 328, 248 S.W.
842 (1923); Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S.E. 836 (1909).
'Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943).
Hanks v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 24 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
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been held sufficient to continue the lease after the expiration of the
primary term.!
"Paying quantities" has been generally defined to mean produc-
tion in quantities sufficient to yield a return in excess of operating
costs, although drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid
and the undertaking considered as a whole may ultimately result
in a loss.' When the well has clearly made a profit over operating
expenses, the courts have no trouble finding production in paying
quantities as a matter of law."0 When the well is marginal, however,
the question is one for the jury," and the question of inclusion of
certain expenses becomes critical. It is clear that production, rather
than sales during the period, is the test;" consequently any oil which
remains unsold at the end of the period will be taken into account."
However, royalties payable to the lessor are not includable in the
income of the well, 4 while overriding royalties payable by the lessee
are not deducted from the income." The question of depreciation
of equipment is unanswered although some cases suggest that it
might properly be included as an operating expense.' Depletion is
not considered an expense,' and the question of overhead and ad-
ministrative expenses allocable to the well is in doubt." Another
highly important factor is the period of time to be taken into ac-
count in determining whether the well has been producing in paying
quantities. The trial court's submission to the jury on the basis of a six
month period was upheld in Sullivan and Garnett v. James,"0 while
s Cowden v. General Crude Oil Co., 217 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error
ref. n.r.e.
'Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942). The phrase thus used to
determine whether the lease continues under the habendum clause must be distinguished
from its use in connection with an express or implied covenant to develop, since under
the covenant the phrase means production in such quantities as would yield to the lessee
a reasonable profit after deducting the entire cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the
well. Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App.2d 616, 191 P.2d 129 (1948).
'
0 Denker v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 56 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1932).
" Sullivan and Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.
n.r.e.
1id. at 893.
13Henry v. Clay, 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954).
'"Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App.2d 616, 191 P.2d 129 (1948);
Garcia v. King, 139 Tex. 578, 164 S.W.2d 509 (1942).
'" Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., supra note 14.
"eSee United Cent. Oil Corp. v. Helm, 11 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1926); Transport
Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App.2d 616, 191 P.2d 129 (1948); Persky v. First
State Bank, 117 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
" Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., supra note 16.
"Sullivan and Garnett v. James, 308 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref.
n.r.e. (Conflicting theories to be resolved by jury.). See Cage, Production in Paying
Quantities: Technical Problems Involved, Southwestern Legal Foundation 10th Annual
Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 61 (1959); Walker, Defects and Ambiguities in Oil and




in Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co." the court rejected a one
month period, stating that the duration should be extended over a
relatively long period so that expenses subject to fluctuation might
be exposed to the levelling influence of time. In Henry v. Clay' the
court considered the entire period of operation of the well. In addi-
tion to the time factor, most courts are influenced by the argument
that since the operator expended large sums in the development of
the well, the profitability of the well should depend on the honest
judgment of the lessee acting in good faith and in view of the sur-
rounding circumstances.2 The opinions state that the judgment of
the lessee is given great weight,2 or that his judgment will prevail
over that of the inexperienced lessor, 4 or that the question is to be
determined "in reference to the judgment of the lessee exercised in
good faith."'" Although some courts have even said that profitability
is for the exclusive determination of the lessee,"6 an analysis of the
facts in these cases shows that his judgment is not conclusive and
that the good faith of the lessee must have some substance in fact."
The Texas Supreme Court in the principal case settles some of the
accounting questions involved in marginal well cases. Citing the
Transport Oil Co." case, the court holds that overriding royalties
should not be treated as an expense and that the operating income is
the entire income attributable to the contractual working interest
created by the original lease." Depreciation of drilling equipment is
not an expense; since the original equipping costs are not included,
the depreciation expense on that equipment should not be includ-
ed. Moreover, inclusion would decrease the incentive to drill.'
With reference to the time factor, the court said that the sixty-day
clause was not determinative of the period of time during which pro-
duction in paying quantities must be made. 1 The court reasoned that
under an arbitrary sixty-day rule an operator, upon sustaining a slight
loss for one month, would have to commence reworking operations
immediately or risk losing the lease if he sustained another slight
loss the next month. Recognizing that there are various reasons for
'0 84 Cal. App.2d 616, 191 P.2d 129 (1948).
21274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954).
222 Summers, Oil and Gas S 307 (1959).
2 Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854 (6th Cir. 1922).
24 Swiss Oil Corp. v. Riggsby, 252 Ky. 374, 67 S.W.2d 30 (1934).
"Gypsy Oil Co. v. Marsh, 121 Okla. 135, 248 Pac. 329 (1926).
"Bouldin v. Gulf Prod. Co., 5 S.W.2d 1019 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error dism.;
Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Bruce, 233 S.W. 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
27Nystel v. Thomas, 42 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
"8Transport Oil Co. v. Exeter Oil Co., 84 Cal. App.2d 616, 191 P.2d 129 (1948).
29 325 S.W.2d at 693.
"The court did not pass on depreciation of pumping equipment.
3' 325 S.W.2d at 690.
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reduced production which might not prevent an eventual overall
profit, the court stated that there can be no arbitrary period for
determining the question;"2 however, the period must be reasonable
under the circumstances. These factors are to be considered with all
other relevant circumstances (including pertinent Railroad Com-
mission proration rules) in determining whether a reasonably pru-
dent operator would, for the purpose of making a profit and not
for mere speculation, continue to operate the well in the manner in
which it was operated." This "prudent operator" test appears new
in Texas law, perhaps derived from the language in Henry v. Clay "'
or Kyle v. Wadley,"s or drawn from the test used to determine if
there is an implied covenant to develop the lease, i.e., whether a
reasonably prudent operator would, in the expectation of making
a profit, develop the lease further."
The decision in the principal case will be helpful in the law of oil
and gas by providing some technical guides for determining whether
a well is producing in paying quantities. The new rules seem well rea-
soned and designed to provide a fair standard for the determination
of actual operating profit or loss. The question of the period of time
is expressly left open to the facts of each particular case, but it is
plain that a lessee may operate with a slight loss for short periods
of time without risking termination of the lease if he reasonably
believes that the well will later show a profit. In addition, the court
establishes plainly a "prudent operator" test, requiring consideration
of profit and loss and all factors which would influence a prudent
operator. Such a standard is somewhat more objective than vague
statements concerning the good faith of the operator although it is
believed that the result will be the same in most cases. The signi-
ficance of the good faith of the operator in the future seems un-
certain. Nevertheless, the court goes far, in this instance, to protect
the investment of the lessee. Query: Is there sufficient protection
12325 S.W.2d at 690.
33325 S.W.2d at 691.
34 274 P.2d 545 (Okla. 1954). The standard by which the judgment and good faith
of the lessee is measured is whether the lease is producing, or by the exercise of reasonable
skill and diligence could be made to produce, sufficient oil and gas to justify a reasonable
and prudent operator in continuing the operation thereof.
3' 24 F. Supp. 884 (W.D. La. 1938).
However, a fair construction of this provision, I believe, means producing
in quantities which a reasonably prudent man in the particular business would
think justified continuing operations, and not by a mere semblance of pro-
duction, the sole apparent purpose of which was to preserve the right, when
and if the lessee saw fit, at some indefinite time in the future, he might
pursue further exploration.




for the lessor in the qualification that the operator must be holding
the lease for the profit from the well in question and not for the
speculative value of future development?
Franklin H. Perry
Taxation - Oil and Gas Depletion - Deduction on
Shut-in Payments
Lessor executed an oil and gas lease to Lessee encompassing 8,165
acres. The lease contained a "shut-in" clause suspending the require-
ment for continued development if any well capable of producing
gas in paying quantities had to be shut in for lack of a satisfactory
market.' In addition, the clause permitted the lease to continue in
effect as to 320 acres around each shut-in well, but only so long as,
and on the condition that, the Lessee exercise reasonable diligence in
obtaining a market for the gas. In exchange for this right to con-
tinue the lease as to the 320 acre tracts, Lessee agreed to pay to
Lessor $5 per acre annually. This payment, however, was not a
condition to be fulfilled for the Lessee to retain the lease; rather the
agreement constituted a covenant, the breach of which would give
rise to money damages but would not cause forfeiture of the lease.
With respect to the remaining acreage, the lease provided for an
annual payment of $5 per acre. This payment, unlike the other, had
to be made as a condition for Lessee to retain the remaining acreage
under the lease; otherwise forfeiture would result. Four gas wells
capable of producing gas in paying quantities were drilled and shut
in for lack of a satisfactory market. Lessee, in compliance with the
terms of the lease, paid Lessor a sum sufficient to retain the entire
8,165 acres. Lessor did not claim the depletion deduction for several
periods after these payments began; subsequently, he filed the pre-
sent suit for a tax refund on the ground that the shut-in payments
were entitled to the percentage depletion deduction. Held: Shut-in
1 Unlike liquid petroleum, gas has characteristics which make it unsuitable for storage.
Rather, it must normally be transported through pipelines and immediately directed to
the consumer. For this reason, wells capable of producing gas in paying quantities are
usually "capped" or "shut-in" until a local market is developed. In such a situation a
"shut-in royalty clause" is inserted in the lease to permit the lease to continue, without
continuous development or actual production, through and past the primary term by the
annual payment of a stated sum per well or per acre. See Malone, Evolution of Shut-in
Royalty Law 1, 2 (1957); Moses, Problems in Connection with Shut-in Royalty Provisions
in Oil and Gas Leases: Part II, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 478 (1953).
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payments in lieu of production which do not cause forfeiture of the
lease in the event of nonpayment are entitled to a depletion deduc-
tion. Johnson v. Phinney, 181 F. Supp. 315 (S.D. Tex. 1960)."
Congress, by an act of legislative grace, allows a taxpayer to take
a depletion deduction in the taxation of proceeds from oil and gas
wells.' The rationale behind the depletion deduction is that mineral
deposits are wasting assets" and that production eventually exhausts
the taxpayer's capital investment.! However, in order to obtain the
depletion deduction a taxpayer must have an "economic interest in
the minerals in place." ' Although the economic interest concept is
a creation of federal law, the legal interests which come within this
concept are determined by the law of the individual states.! In
Texas, for example, royalty payments, bonus payments,9 and
minimum and substitute royalties"0 are entitled to the depletion
deduction.1 Under the Texas interpretation of oil and gas leases a
Appeal has been granted in this case.
See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938); Helvering v.
Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938); Bell v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 157 (9th Cir.
1944); O'Shaughnessy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1941); Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, §§ 611, 613.
'Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); O'Shaughnessy, Inc. v. Commissioner,
supra note 3.
'4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 24.02 (rev. ed. 1960); Miller, Oil and Gas-
Federal Income Taxation 9 (3d ed. 1957).
'Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933). The latest case on this point is Scofield
v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 268 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933
(1960), noted, 14 Sw. L.J. 420 (1960); Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b) (1960); Miller, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 10.
"Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U.S.
299 (1932); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Ferguson v. Commissioner, 45
F.2d 573, 576-77 (5th Cir. 1930); Annot., 74 A.L.R. 183 (1931). This list of citations
points Out also that a bonus is a state concept entirely different from royalty payments;
however, because of the similarity in consequences attained upon their payment, bonuses
are allowed the depletion deduction under federal law, as are royalties.
' Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, supra note 7;
Laird v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1937); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. Bull.
214.2 Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940); Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S.
322 (1934); 31-A Tex. Jur. Oil and Gas S 475, at 815, § 476, at 818 (1947).
1See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Commissioner v.
Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956), noted, 10 Sw. L.J. 333 (1956); James
Lewis Caldwell McFaddin, 2 T.C. 395 (1943), modified on other grounds, 148 F.2d 570
(5th Cir. 1945), acq., 1943 Cum. Bull. 16.
"1James Lewis Caldwell McFaddin, supra note 10; Breeding and Burton, Taxation of
Oil and Gas Income § 8.07, at 112 (1945). However, Breeding and Burton point out that
"if the minimum royalty payments are not recoverable from future production, and the
lessee may forfeit the lease by nonpayment of the minimum royalties, the Revenue Service
will probably consider payments made prior to production as delay rentals." It has also
been stated by another writer that minimum royalties paid before production are actually
bonus payments. Miller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 63. Also depletable are working interests,
Perkins v. Thomas, 301 U.S. 655 (1937); Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293
U.S. 312 (1934); oil and gas payments, Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., supra
note 10; and many others. Miller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 63-77.
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royalty interest is an interest in realty;" payments thereon (charac-
terized as royalty payments) constitute consideration for actual
removal of the realty."3 The royalty interest is regarded as an
economic interest because royalty payments are dependent upon
production." Bonus payments in Texas represent advance payments
for oil and gas to be extracted in the future"5 or additional con-
sideration for the lease; hence, in Herring v. Commissioner" the
United States Supreme Court held that bonus payments are entitled
to the depletion deduction even though no physical depletion of
the corpus has occurred. Minimum and substitute royalties set a
minimum figure for royalty payments regardless of the quantity of
gas produced."8 On the other hand, Texas courts regard delay rentals
as payment for additional time to utilize the land and not as income
from production; 9 hence, federal courts disallow a depletion deduc-
tion for delay rental payments" on the ground that the payments
do not arise out of an economic interest." Thus, the eligibility of
a particular payment for the depletion deduction is determined by
its nature as a royalty or rental. 2
Shut-in payments are similar to minimum royalties since both
accomplish a spreading out of future income over the entire period
of the lease when a situation exists in which either little or no actual
production is being accomplished.23 Since both types of payments
represent future income and not rent, it is only natural that, like
" Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.S. 113 (1927); Sheppard v. Stanolind
Oil & Gas Co., 125 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref.; see 31-A Tex. Jur.
Oil and Gas § 567, at 982 (1947).
"aCommissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935); State Nat'l Bank v. Morgan,
135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940); Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., supra note
12; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 611, 613; 31-A Tex. Jur. Oil and Gas § 479, at 826
(1947).
"4State Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, supra note 13; 31-A Tex. Jur. Oil and Gas § 475,
at 815 (1947).
"SHerring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934); State Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 135
Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940); Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 125 S.W.2d 643
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref.
'0 Report No. 10, P-H Oil & Gas Taxes, at 6 (May 18, 1960).
17293 U.S. 322 (1934).
"SMalone, op. cit. supra note 1, at 100. The purpose of the shut-in royalty is for
compensation during times of nonproduction, whereas the minimum royalty is used when
there is a small amount of production.
"
9 J. T. Sneed, Jr., 33 B.T.A. 478 (1935), acq., XV-1 Cum. Bull. 21 (1936) (Delay
rentals are more in the nature of liquidated damages or a penalty for failure to drill.)
2"Houston Farms Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1942); Com-
missioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
21 Commissioner v. Wilson, supra note 20; 31-A Tex. Jur. Oil and Gas § 145, at 247,
§ 479, at 826 (1947); Miller, op. cit. supra note 5, at 151.
22 181 F. Supp. 315.
'1 Patterson v. Texas Co., 131 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 761
(1943); State Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509, 143 S.W.2d 757 (1940); Sheffield
v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d 1021 (1934); 31-A Tex. Jur. Oil and Gas § 475, at
815 (1947).
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minimum royalties, shut-in payments are considered royalty." Pro-
duction rather than rental payment is normally necessary for the
lease to remain in force beyond the primary term.2 Shut-in clauses
usually specify that the payments are a substitute for production;
therefore, rental payments to keep the lease operative are no longer
required. In Morriss v. First Nat'l Bank 7 the court held that since
the typical shut-in payment was a substitute for production and
constituted the well a producing well, the payments were royalties
and not rentals." The Morriss case represents virtually the only
judicial determination concerning the nature of shut-in payments
as royalty or rental; however, the holding comports with the view
of most writers in the oil and gas field.2"
The effect of nonpayment of a stipulated sum in a lease is the
most important criterion in determining whether a rent or royalty
is involved." The lessor's remedy for failure to make payment of a
royalty is recovery of damages in a breach of contract action." On
the other hand, one remedy for failure to make a rental payment is
termination of the lease and recovery by the lessor of the right to
extract minerals." The issue in the principal case involved the pre-
sence of royalty and rental payments pertaining to different areas
of realty, both of which were erroneously considered shut-in royalties
by the lessor." The court, however, correctly distinguished the two
types of payments by noting that nonpayment of the amount
24 However, if the shut-in payments are not recoverable from future production, it
appears that the payments should be treated as a delay rental. Breeding and Burton, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 113; see Malone, op. cit. supra note 1, at 105, wherein the author
states that all courts have held shut-in payments to be royalties and not rents. 31-A
Tex. Jur. Oil and Gas § 475, at 815 (1947).
21Masterson, The Shut-in Royalty Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 12 Sw. L.J. 459,
474 (1958); Moses, op. cit. supra note 1, at 480.
"6 Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 141 Tex. 274, 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943); Morriss
v. First Nat'l Bank, 249 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.; see Moses
Problems in Connection with Shut-in Provisions in Oil and Gas Leases, 23 Tul. L. Rev.
374, 379 (1949) (The fact that the shut-in payments are less than the delay rentals
would have been is of no consequence.).
27 Supra note 26; see also Moses, op. cit. supra note 1, at 480.
" But see Malone, op. cit. supra note 1, at 64; Masterson, supra note 25, at 472,
where it is stated that the court actually had before it a minimum royalty clause, not
a shut-in clause.
"0 Scurlock, Practical and Legal Problems in Delay Rentals and Shut-in Royalty Pay-
ments, Southwestern Legal Foundation 4th Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax., 17, 37
(1953); see Masterson, A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 6 Sw. L.J. 1, 37 (1952);
Walker, Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases Providing for the Payment of an Annual Sum as
Royalty on a Nonproducing Gas Well, 24 Texas L. Rev. 478, 479 (1946); but see
Breeding and Burton, op. cit. supra note 11, at 113.
"oReport No. 10, P-H Oil & Gas Taxes, at 6 (May 18, 1960).
" Shell Oil Co. v. Goodroe, 197 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) error ref.
n.r.e.; see Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289 (1941);
Malone, op. cit. supra note 1, at 55, 56; Moses, op. cit. supra note 26, at 377.
32 Ibid.
33181 F. Supp. 315.
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specified as to the 320 acres around each well would not terminate
the lease.3 ' The only condition to holding the 320 acres was the
exercise of reasonable diligence in obtaining a market.' Consequently,
the agreement to pay an amount for the 320 acres was merely a
covenant, the breach of which would give rise to money damages
but would not terminate the lease.' Thus, the court stated that the
payments made for the 320 acre tracts were similar to minimum or
substitute royalty payments in lieu of production; the payments were
eligible for the depletion deduction because nonpayment thereof
would not terminate the lease." Moreover, the court pointed out
that the payments regarding the 320 acre tracts were not delay
rentals because the lease had been developed and production was
obtained. 8 This view is supported by a recent Treasury Regulation
which defines delay rentals as "an amount paid for the privilege of
"'39deferring development of the property. ...
Shut-in payments are typically a means of preserving the lessee's
economic interest in the minerals in place. They are indirectly con-
nected to production and the exhaustion of assets; therefore, they
should be given the same consideration as bonus or royalty payments
which are used to acquire an economic interest. The principal case
is of importance as an extension of the definition of "royalty" as
well as an expansion into the field of taxation of the rules set forth
in the Morriss case. The test enunciated by the court for determin-
ing the nature of the shut-in payments as rental or royalty is
whether the lessor's remedy for nonpayment is termination of the
lease. If so, the payment is delay rental and not royalty and there-
fore is not eligible for the depletion deduction. Thus, considerable
caution is required in drafting and interpreting the "shut-in clause."
The parties to the lease may designate the payments as "royalties"
and take advantage of the depletion deduction only by strict com-
pliance with certain requirements. First, a "substitute for production"
clause similar to that in the principal case must provide that reason-
able diligence in seeking a market for the shut-in gas is the determin-
ing factor in allowing the lease to progress from the primary to the
secondary term. Secondly, if a sum of money is stipulated, non-
payment thereof must not be grounds for termination of the lease.
If a substitute for production clause is incorporated with a provision
"Id. at 320.
31 181 F. Supp. 315, 320.
38 Ibid.
37 181 F. Supp. 315, 321.
8 181 F. Supp. 315.
"9Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(c) (1960).
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for a stated sum of money with no requirement of diligence in
seeking a market, in all probability the court will construe the pay-
ment as rent, rather than royalty, and disallow the depletion de-
duction. Thus, the principal case is illustrative of the view that
substance rather than form controls in the field of taxation; the
nature of a payment as royalty or rental is determined by the
objectives of the clause and not by the title.
James L. Collins
Torts - Negligence - Duty of Care Imposed Upon
Operator of Escalator
Plaintiff brought suit for injuries sustained while riding on an
escalator which suddenly jerked and caused her to fall. The escalator,
owned by and under the exclusive control of Defendant, was op-
erated for the convenience and use of Defendant's customers. Held:
The operators of escalators, while not common carriers, are under a
duty to use the high degree of care required of common carriers.
Mattox v. C. R. Anthony Co., 326 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) error ref. n.r.e.
Negligence is any conduct which falls below the standard estab-
lished by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risks
of harm.1 Before negligence is actionable there must be a breach' of
a legal duty to conform to a particular standard of conduct owed
the injured party by the actor,' and the act must be the actual and
proximate cause4 of the damage suffered. The standard of care to
which one has a duty to conform is that of "a reasonable man under
like circumstances."' The degree of care required must be com-
mensurate with the danger;' therefore, the law places on some per-
sons a higher degree of care either because the risk they take is highly
'United States v. Waterman Steam Ship Corp., 190 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1951);
2 Restatement, Torts S 282 (1934).
'Chicago, R. 1. & G. Ry. v. Rhone, 105 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error
dism.; Prosser, Torts § 35 (2d ed. 1955).
'Morgan v. Empire So. Gas Co., 236 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Prosser,
op. cit. supra note 2, at § 36.
' Thompson v. Tippit, 300 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e., cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 943 (1958); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 44.
'Moore v. Virginia Transit Co., 188 Va. 493, 50 S.E.2d 268 (1948); 2 Restatement,
Torts § 283 (1934).
' Meredith v. Reed, 26 Ind. 334 (1866); West Tex. Util. Co. v. Renner, 32 S.W.2d
264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), modified, 53 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
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dangerous' or because they accept an unusual responsibility to the
public, e.g., common carriers.
A common carrier of passengers is one who undertakes for hire to
carry all persons who may apply for passage.! Accordingly, persons
operating buses,"0 trucks," airplanes,"2 railroads,M taxicabs,' and ski
lifts" are common carriers where they represent themselves as will-
ing to serve all. Many courts hold the owners and operators of ele-
vators to be common carriers on the theory that they are serving
the public interest," but ignore the tests applied to common carri-
ers, i.e., that the carriage is for hire and that the operator must un-
dertake to carry all persons who apply for passage.' Generally, the
same principles applied to cases involving elevators are applied to
those involving escalators, i.e., holding the owner and operator of
the escalator as a common carrier." Moreover other courts, without
designating the owners and operators of elevators" and escalators"
as common carriers, have reached the same result by holding that
they owe to the public the duty to exercise a high degree of care in
view of the character of the mode of conveyance adopted. How-
ever, some jurisdictions hold that they owe only the duty to use
"Smith v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 74 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1935) (electricity);
Rafferty v. Davis, 260 Pa. 563, 103 Ati. 951 (1918) (explosives).
'Indianapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291 (1876) (highest possible degree
of care and diligence); Carson v. Boston Elevated Ry., 309 Mass. 32, 33 N.E.2d 701
(1941) (highest degree of care).
'Weeden v. Gher, 316 Il. 534, 147 N.E. 388 (1925); Burnett v. Riter, 276 S.W.
347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
'°Austin Bros. Transfer Co. v. Bloom, 316 Ill. 435, 147 N.E. 387 (1925).
"Rogers v. Crespi & Co., 259 S.W.2d. 928 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
"Pacific No. Airlines v. Alaska Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 592 (D. Alaska 1948).
"3Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Davenport, 205 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1953).
"Anderson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 228 N.Y. 475, 127 N.E. 584 (1920).
"Vogel v. State, 204 Misc. 614, 124 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. N.Y. 1953).
'Johnson v. Hopkins, 213 Ala. 492, 105 So. 663 (1925); Carson v. Weston Hotel
Corp., 351 Ill. App. 523, 115 N.E.2d 800 (1953); Murphy's Hotel, Inc. v. Cuddy's
Adm'r, 124 Va. 207, 97 S.E. 794 (1919); Atkeson v. Jackson Estate, 72 Wash. 233, 130
Pac. 102 (1913), aff'd, 74 Wash. 700, 134 Pac. 175 (1913). Contra: Seaver v. Bradley,
179 Mass. 329, 60 N.E. 795 (1901).
"Brown v. De Marie, 131 W. Va. 264, 46 S.E.2d 797 (1948).
'"White v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 242 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1957); Weiner v. May
Dep't Stores Co., 35 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Simmons v. F.W. Woolworth Co.,
163 Cal. App.2d 709, 329 P.2d 999 (1958); Mader v. Mandel Bros. Dep't Store, 314
Il. App. 263, 41 N.E.2d 327 (1942); Haley v. May Dep't Stores Co., 287 S.W.2d 366
(Mo. Ct. App. 1956); Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515, 44 N.E.2d
726 (1942); Petrie v. Kaufman & Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211, 139 Atl. 878 (1927).
'Parker v. Manchester Hotel Co., 29 Cal. App.2d 446, 85 P.2d 152 (1939); Owners'
Realty Co. v. Richardson, 158 Md. 367, 148 Atl. 543 (1930).
"Hecht Co. v. Jacobsen, 180 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1950); S.S. Kresge Co. v. McCallion,
58 F.2d 931 (8th Cir. 1932); Vallette v. Maison Blanche Co., 29 So. 2d 528 (La. Ct.
App. 1947).
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reasonable care required for business invitees." Notwithstanding
divergent theories on the requisite standard of care, there is general
agreement that the owner and operator is not an absolute insurer
for the safety of his passengers."
The principal case is one of first impression in Texas. 3 The court
held that although an escalator is not a common carrier, its very
nature required the high degree of care of a common carrier. In
dealing with elevator cases Texas courts" have followed those juris-
dictions"2 which hold that the owners and operators are not common
carriers but owe the same duty of a high degree of care required of
common carriers. This reasoning refuses to torture the theory of
common carriers to cover the owners and operators of escalators
while it still imposes the strict duty of exercising the highest degree
of care. 8 The decision in the instant case, like most elevator" and
escalator" cases, was brought under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
imposing a prima facie case of negligence against the operator of
the escalator where there is proof of a sudden jerk."9 However, the
use of this doctrine does not dispense with the question of the duty
imposed upon the operator since the doctrine gives only an inference
that the defendant has not exercised reasonable care and is not in
itself proof that he was under any duty to exercise such care."0 Thus,
21 Stratton v. J.J. Newbury, 117 Conn. 522, 169 At. 56 (1933); Conway v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 255 Mass. 571, 152 N.E. 94 (1926); Richter v. L. Bamberger & Co., 11
N.J. Misc. 229, 165 Atl. 289 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Calabrese v. McCreery & Co., 187 Misc.
538, 67 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
22 Weiner v. May Dep't Stores Co., 35 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Blodgett v.
Walker Scott Corp., 99 Cal. App.2d 251, 221 P.2d 325 (1950); Petrie v. Kaufmann &
Baer Co., 291 Pa. 211, 139 Atl. 878 (1927).
23The question of duty was mentioned but not decided in two earlier Texas cases.
Ford v. Leonard's, 228 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Franner v. Joske Bros.,
227 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref.
24Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Hanks, 104 Tex. 320, 137 S.W. 1120 (1911);
O'Connor v. Dallas Cotton Exch., 153 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Dulaney Inv.
Co. v. Wood, 142 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism. judgm. cor.; City
Nat'l Bank v. Pigott, 270 S.W. 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). One Texas case has held the
owner and operator to the duty of ordinary care only. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v.
Chocolate Shop Inc., 30 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), aff'd, 44 S.W.2d 989 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1932).
25 Parker v. Manchester Hotel Co., 29 Cal. App.2d 446, 85 P.2d 152 (1939); Owners'
Realty Co. v. Richardson, 158 Md. 367, 148 Atl. 543 (1930).2' Brown v. De Marie, 131 W. Va. 264, 46 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1948).
27Haag v. Harris, 4 Cal.2d 108, 48 P.2d 1 (1935); Cramer v. Mergard, 56 Ohio
App. 493, 11 N.E.2d 108 (1937); Moohr v. Victoria Inv. Co., 146 Wash. 251, 262 Pac.
643 (1928); Senft v. Ed. Schuster & Co., 250 Wis. 406, 27 N.W.2d 464 (1947).
21 Young v. Anchor Co., 239 N.C. 288, 79 S.E.2d 785 (1954); Vallette v. Maison
Blanche Co., 29 So. 2d 528 (La. Ct. App. 1947); Hartnett v. May Dep't Stores Co.,
231 Mo. App. 1116, 85 S.W.2d 644 (1935); Hesemann v. May Dep't Stores Co., 225
Mo. App. 584, 39 S.W.2d 797 (1931); Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App.
515, 44 N.E.2d 726 (1942).
29 326 S.W.2d 740, at 744.
"°Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, at 210.
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duty of care is still an essential element in a negligence case involv-
ing an escalator when brought under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
In this modern age there is an increasing use of mechanical ma-
chinery for the transportation of people, as for example the eleva-
tor, the escalator, and a new innovation, the "moving sidewalk."
Since the danger of injury grows with the use of such machinery,
the high degree of care required of the owners and operators of
escalators in Texas is a most desirable result in the law of torts.
Jay Ungerman
Trusts - Spendthrift Provisions - Validity of Restraints
on Alienation Where Settlor Is Beneficiary
A husband and wife created four irrevocable trusts naming them-
selves as beneficiaries. The trusts contained spendthrift provisions
which restrained voluntary and involuntary alienation of the inter-
ests of the settlor-beneficiaries. Shortly before her death, the wife
assigned to Defendant, for value, her interest in the four trusts
which was then due or to become due. Plaintiff, trustee, contended
that the assignment constituted a violation of the spendthrift pro-
visions in the trusts and was therefore invalid. Held: A settlor can-
not create a trust for his own benefit which restrains voluntary
and/or involuntary alienation of the beneficial interest. Glass v. Car-
penter, 330 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.
Under a normal trust the settlor may be the beneficiary;' he may
transfer his interest' or have it subjected to claims of creditors.! The
purpose of a spendthrift trust, however, is to restrain the beneficiary's
interest from voluntary and/or' involuntary alienation.! The major-
ity of states,' including Texas,' permit a settlor to insert spendthrift
'Mayer v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 222 U.S. 295 (1911); United Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Ark. 1946); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 261 S.W.2d
892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref.
'Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
'Nichols v. Levy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 433 (1866); In re Moulton's Estate, 233 Minn.
286, 46 N.W.2d 667 (1951).
' The creator of a trust may restrain alienation involuntarily and at the same time
allow voluntary alienation. Bogert, Cases on Trusts S 8 (2d ed. 1950); but see Scott,
Trusts S 152.3 (1956).
5In Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref., it was stated
that immunity from debts of the beneficiary and inalienability of the fund by him are
necessary incidents of a spendthrift trust. Cf. Keeler v. Diemer, 334 Pa. 225, 3 A.2d
413 (1939); Restatement, Trusts 2d § 152.2 (1959).
a See Bogert, Trusts § 40 (3d ed. 1952).
"Commissioner v. Lightner, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945); Hinds v. Sands, 312
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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provisions restraining voluntary' and involuntary' alienation of the
beneficial interest, provided the trust complies with general trust law
in all other respects." Restraints against involuntary alienation, i.e.,
alienation by operation of law for debts of the beneficiaries, apply
both to present and future creditors.1 The motive for the trust need
not be expressed' if a clear intent to create a spendthrift trust is
present."3 Moreover, the beneficiary need not in fact be a spendthrift,
improvident, or incapable of handling his affairs. 4 When the bene-
ficiary acquires possession of his interest, all restraints against aliena-
tion are invalid." Moreover, creditors of remaindermen may reach
vested remainder interests even though the spendthrift provisions
regarding the trust beneficiaries are valid as to the trust benefici-
aries." Although this type of trust is widely accepted, fraud by the
settlor in an attempt to evade creditors will vitiate the entire trust.
It is universally held that spendthrift provisions in a trust created
by the settlor for his own benefit do not apply to the settlor's credi-
tors"s even though the state recognizes the validity of spendthrift
'Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882); Hinds v. Sands, supra note 7.
'Hoffman v. Hoffman, 8 N.J. 157, 84 A.2d 441 (1951); Estes v. Estes, 267 S.W.
709 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924); Caples v. Buell, 243 S.W. 1066 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).
"°In Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875), it was held that spendthrift trusts were
valid so long as the settlor violated no law in conditioning his bounty in this manner.
See Estes v. Estes, supra note 9. A spendthrift trust must comply with the requisites as
to creation, existence, and validity of trusts generally. Kessner v. Phillips, 189 Mo. 515,
88 S.W. 66 (1905).
"Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 Atl. 497 (1888); Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams,
133 Mass. 170 (1882); Estes v. Estes, 267 S.W. 709 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924). The
theory is that the grantor would not have given the property had it been liable for the
beneficiary's debts and that creditors have no right to rely on property thus held as they
are held to exercise proper diligence in ascertaining limitations on the security for the
beneficiary's debt.
"Adams v. Williams, 112 Tex. 469, 248 S.W. 673 (1923).
saMellon v. Driscoll, 117 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1941); Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.
14Adams v. Williams, 112 Tex. 469, 248 S.W. 673 (1923); Hinds v. Sands, 312
S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
"Kelly v. Kelly, 11 Cal.2d 356, 79 P.2d 1059 (1938). As to assignments in violation
of the spendthrift trust, some courts say even the executory contract is void forever; other
courts say, though not effective when made, when the beneficiary gets the property, the
contract is effective though previously written. See Annot., 119 A.L.R. 78 (1939).
"' Once the beneficiary obtains possession of the trust income or corpus a creditor may
reach that portion. Estes v. Estes, 267 S.W. 709 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924).
'Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 224 (1951) and materials discussed in footnote 78
of that section.
"McFaddin v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945); Hughes v. Commissioner,
104 F.2d 144, 148 (9th Cir. 1939) (applying the rule to both past and future creditors,
fraudulent intent is not necessary); Nelson v. California Trust Co., 33 Cal.2d 501, 202
P.2d 1021 (1949); Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Windram, 133 Mass. 175 (1882); Menken Co.
v. Brinkley, 94 Tenn. 721, 31 S.W. 92 (1895); Booth v. Chadwick, 154 S.W.2d 268
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m. (provisions invalid even though the settlor-
beneficiary was in fact a spendthrift); Petty v. Moores Brook Sanitarium, 110 Va. 815,
67 S.E. 335 (1910); Bogert, Trusts S 40 (3d ed. 1952); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §
224, at 493 (1951); Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts 5 478 (2d ed. 1947); Restatement,
Trusts 2d 5 156.2 (1959); Scott, Trusts § 156 (1956).
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trusts.19 However, the creditors may reach only the interest which
the settlor-beneficiary retained," unless fraud was the motive of the
trust.2 The prevailing view is that restrictions on voluntary aliena-
tion by the settlor-beneficiary are also invalid."2
Where the settlor is the sole beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, he
cannot restrain the voluntary alienation of his interest;" but he can
terminate the trust at will despite the existence of an irrevocability
clause. 4 However, the settlor-beneficiary may include other bene-
ficiaries whose interest allows them to enforce the irrevocability
clause." Moreover, these beneficiaries can prevent the settlor from
suing to annul the trust even though the settlor's power to alienate
his interest is not impaired by the spendthrift provisions." One
Texas case stated that although Texas recognizes the invalidity of
restraints against both voluntary and involuntary alienation when
a spendthrift trust is created by a settlor-beneficiary, special circum-
stances might alter a case to allow the restraint to be valid against
the claims of creditors and assignees. However, the case was decided
" This statement applies regardless of whether common law, case law, or statute is the
criterion. Security Trust Co. v. Sharp, 32 Del. Ch. 3, 77 A.2d 543 (1950).20De Hierapolis v. Lawrence, 115 Fed. 761 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1902); Murphy v. C.I.T.
Corp., 347 Pa. 591, 33 A.2d 16 (1943) (interest reserved); Mogridge's Estate, 342 Pa.
308, 20 A.2d 307 (1941) (principal reserved). Only the spendthrift provision is void and
not the remainder of the trust. Benedict v. Benedict, 261 Pa. 117, 104 Atl. 581 (1918).
The beneficiary's transferees and assignees could reach the interest transferred to them
despite the spendthrift provisions in the trust. Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Windham, 133 Mass.
175 (1882). The settlor cannot attack the validity of the act of trust creation, but his
creditors and assignees can assert the invalidity of the spendthrift provision. Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees § 224, at 493 (1951). See also, Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts §§ 474-77(2d ed. 1947); Restatement, Trusts 2d § 156.1 (1959).
21Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 224 (1951).
"Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Hicks, 173 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Pilkingham v. West,
264 N.C. 575, 99 S.E.2d 798 (1957); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 224, at 493 (1951);
Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 493 (2d ed. 1947); Scott, Trusts § 156 (1956). Contra:
Hackley v. Littell, 150 Mich. 106, 113 N.W. 787 (1907).
"Security Trust Co. v. Sharp, 32 Del. Ch. 3, 77 A.2d 543 (1950); Weymouth v.
Delaware Trust Co., 29 Del. Ch. 1, 45 A.2d 427 (1946); Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co.
v. Williams, 268 Ky. 671, 105 S.W.2d 814 (1937).
24 Security Trust Co. v. Sharp, supra note 23. Courts have established an exception to
this rule in isolated cases involving settlors who are epileptics, Fidelity & Columbia Trust
Co. v. Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 268 S.W. 537 (1925), or habitual drunkards, in that al-
though creditors and assignees may have a valid claim against a settlor-beneficiary spend-
thrift trust, the settlor himself is powerless to revoke the trust if it contains an irrevo-
cability clause. Downs v. Security Trust Co., 175 Ky. 789, 194 S.W. 1041 (1917);
Reidy v. Small, 154 Pa. 505, 26 Atl. 602 (1893).
2s Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Hicks, 173 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Byrnes v. Commis-
sioner, 110 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1940); Rose v. Third Nat'l Bank, 27 Tenn. App. 553,
183 S.W.2d 1 (1944); 54 Am. Jur. Trusts § 147 (1945).
'"Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Hicks, supra note 25; Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v.
Gwynn, 206 Ky. 823, 268 S.W. 537 (1925); Merchant Nat'l Bank v. Morrissey, 329
Mass. 601, 109 N.E.2d 821 (1953); Rose v. Third Nat'l Bank, supra note 25.
"Booth v. Chadwick, 154 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m. The
issue there involved a spendthrift trust created by a settlor-beneficiary while in prison. The
court stated that possibly such a trust would not be against public policy during the
interval of time the settlor was in prison.
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on other grounds and the above statement was dictum." This dictum
is the only intimation that Texas will not give restraints on both
voluntary and involuntary alienation the same treatment, i.e., that
both will violate public policy in a settlor-beneficiary trust. How-
ever, Michigan has held, in a situation identical with that in the
principal case, that restraints against involuntary alienation were
invalid and against public policy, but restraints on voluntary alie-
nation were valid and would be upheld against assignees of the
settlor-beneficiary." This Michigan case cannot be reconciled with
the prevailing majority view regarding restraints on voluntary
alienation."
Although the principal case is clearly correct according to existing
case law, it would seem that more investigation of the desirability of
applying the instant holding to restraints on voluntary alienation
might be beneficial, especially since Texas had not previously decided
the point. Concededly, such a restraint on involuntary alienation
must necessarily be invalidated to protect creditors; however, re-
straints on voluntary alienation are of a completely different char-
acter. Thus, on the one hand is the question of allowing a man to
put his property so far out of his own control that he cannot
voluntarily alienate it even though he retains the benefit of it and
is of full legal capacity. On the other hand is the question of allow-
ing a man of full legal capacity to create a trust and then violate
its terms at will. Most writers feel that it is impossible to formulate
a rule holding that a man can bind his own future conduct for all
time in a manner which concerns only himself." However, it should
be noted that one state has considered the problem legislatively.
Kansas, by statute, has validated restraints on voluntary alienation
in settlor-beneficiary spendthrift trusts. 2 One recurring theory is
that if a man can be allowed to live debt free on the bounty of
another through a spendthrift trust created for his benefit, why
should he not be allowed to put aside a portion of his own earned
accumulations for protection from involuntary alienation by credit-
ors in order to prevent total financial disaster. This thought, evidenc-
ed by the Texas decision of Booth v. Chadwick," has merit and
2 Ibid.
" Hackley v. Littell, 150 Mich. 106, 113 N.W. 787 (1907).
'°See Bogert, Trust and Trustees § 224 (1951); Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 493
(2d ed. 1947); Scott, Trusts § 156 (1956).
"1Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts S 493 (2d ed. 1947).
" Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-101 (1949). Settlor-beneficiary trusts are valid as to credi-
tors, past, present, and future.
33 154 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref. w.o.m.
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should be considered simultaneously with the problem of restraint
on voluntary alienation should the Texas Legislature ever attempt
to enact a statute similar to the existing Kansas law.
James L. Collins
